

**The Ramakrishna Mission
Institute of Culture Library**

Presented by

Dr. Baridbaran Mukerji

RMICL—3

17 85

LOTZE'S
OUTLINES OF PHILOSOPHY
V
ÆSTHETICS

OUTLINES
OF
ÆSTHETICS

DICTATED PORTIONS
OF THE
LECTURES OF HERMANN LOTZE


TRANSLATED AND EDITED BY

GEORGE T. LADD

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN YALE COLLEGE

BOSTON
GINN & COMPANY

1886



Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1886, by
GEORGE T. LADD,
in the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.

R.M.I.C. LIBRARY	
App. No.	Printed at BOSTON, MASS., U. S. A.
Class No.	
Date	
St. Card	
Class	
Cat	
Bk	
Ch.	

1.785

EDITOR'S PREFACE.

THE "Outlines of Æsthetics," like those already published upon the subjects of Practical Philosophy and the Philosophy of Religion, comprises the only systematic presentation of the author's opinions on a subject of great interest as approached from the philosophical point of view. These brief lecture-notes are presented in the place of what Lotze would have written if he had lived to complete the third volume of his System of Philosophy. Several other monographs by his hand, however, cover various parts of the general theory of the beautiful and of its application to the arts, with considerably more of detail than do the chapters of this volume of *Dictate*. Two articles, which originally appeared in the "Göttinger Studien" and were afterward published separately, discussed the topics treated in the two chapters of the first, or more strictly theoretical part of this volume. Of these, the one published in 1845 dealt with "the Conception of Beauty"; the other appeared in 1847 and bore the title "Concerning the Conditions of Beauty in Art." Still later (1868) Lotze wrote on the "History of

Æsthetics in Germany," as a contribution to a History of the Sciences in Germany, edited in seven volumes by the historical commission of the Royal Academy of Sciences under the patronage of Maximilian II., king of Bavaria. Certain passages in the *Microcosmus* and an entire chapter on "Beauty and Art" (chap. iii. of Book VIII.) testify to his continued interest and activity in the study of this subject.

The German from which this translation is made was prepared upon the basis of the lectures delivered in the Summer-semester of 1856. After this date we find a course on *Æsthetics* announced only once, — namely, in 1865. Like all the other *Dictate*, the original was subjected to the revision of Professor Rehnisch. The "Outlines of the *Æsthetics*" was the last to appear in the series of eight published in Germany; it bears the date of 1884.

The original contains a relatively lengthy appendix made up of various matters chiefly of interest to German readers; — a eulogistic and memorial sketch by Professor Rehnisch, copies of the testimonials (*Abgangszeugniss*) given to Lotze by the Gymnasium of Zittau and the University of Leipzig, a list of his "literary publications," and a survey of his activities as a teacher (a catalogue of his lecture-courses year by year) in the Universities of Leipzig, Göttingen,

and Berlin. The German appendix has not been translated and incorporated into this volume, because most of its material belongs to the details of biography, and it has not been our purpose to speak, or to cause others to speak, *about* Lotze; but rather to let this philosopher, in his own chosen words, speak for himself. We note, however, that the testimonial of his University, the list of his publications, and the catalogue of his lecture-courses, all show how large a portion of his earlier energies was devoted to the subjects of Medicine, Pathology, Physiology, and other most closely allied pursuits. It was this which fitted him to approach philosophical questions from points of view, and by ways of treatment, fitted to command the attention and respect of an age trained in the methods, and deferential toward the claims and discoveries, of the physical and natural sciences.

The reader will find in the theoretical discussions of the "Outlines of *Æsthetics*" a certain vagueness and apparent unwillingness to enter upon the task of attempting clear definitions. We are not told in any one compact sentence what Beauty is; nor is it made perfectly obvious in few words how it is that there can be nothing beautiful without the self-enjoyment of conscious spirit, and yet how at the same time, "Things" can be objectively beautiful.

But we are told that the beautiful is not given to man in the form of a concrete intuition, or of a finished concept whose marks may be distinguished and read off in order by the aid of logical processes. The beautiful is rather given to man in the form of the Idea. No individual, therefore, can fully compass it, can have more than a share in the understanding of it,—according to the degree of his attainment in the culture of its appreciation.

If those who are wise in the principles and maxims of the different arts differ from Lotze upon various points considered in this volume, it will not be at all strange. Even the wisest in such matters differ among themselves; perhaps, not infrequently, the wiser they are, the more they differ. And yet they agree in holding that the truths which underlie the representation of the beautiful in art are by nature universal and eternal. All such will find a manifest feeling of sympathy and a courtesy of manner, which are in themselves both ethical and æsthetic, pervading these brief chapters from the mind and heart of a genial philosopher.

GEORGE T. LADD.

NEW HAVEN, July, 1886.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.



	PAGE
FIRST PRINCIPAL DIVISION.	
CHAPTER I. Of Beauty and of Fancy	3
CHAPTER II. The Actualization of the Beautiful and its Kinds	22
SECOND PRINCIPAL DIVISION.	
CHAPTER III. Music	33
CHAPTER IV. Architecture	47
CHAPTER V. Plastic Art	68
CHAPTER VI. Painting	80
CHAPTER VII. Poetic Art	91



FIRST PRINCIPAL DIVISION.

FIRST PRINCIPAL DIVISION.

CHAPTER I.

OF BEAUTY AND OF FANCY.

§ 1. We are induced to call anything 'agreeable' or 'beautiful' simply by the impression of pleasure which it produces in us. But we distinguish the 'agreeable' as an impression which is valid only for *us* individually, from the 'beautiful' which we require should be recognized by *all* as such.

From what has just been said we derive the following view: That is *agreeable* which harmonizes with those conditions of our being that are individual and not necessarily of universal validity; on the contrary, that is *beautiful* whose impression accords with that organization of our nature which is unchangeable and common to all individuals. That is to say, we believe that whatever excites our cognitive activity to a manifoldness of expressions adapted to it is beautiful; and starting from this point of view, *Æsthetics* has investigated the rules of art, in

accordance with which suitable encitements should be furnished to this natural play of our imagination, by putting expectation on the stretch, by enhancing the impression, by surprising effect, by combining a variety of elements into a whole that admits of easy intuition, by subjecting many things under a law easy to discover, etc.

§ 2. But such a universal validity as we require our æsthetic judgment should have is not conceded to us; on the contrary, men's views concerning what is beautiful are, in fact, less in accord than their judgments concerning much which is only agreeable.

The impression of 'beauty' therefore cannot be referred to some uniform standard actually existing in us, to a spiritual organization actually existing in all individuals; but only to one such that it has first to be realized in each person by means of development, and realized in each only in an imperfect and one-sided way.

Any impression will accordingly appear 'beautiful' which harmonizes with that *part* of this ideal condition which has been actualized in us; and just because we are firmly convinced that it does not please us merely as an individual person, but pleases the universal spirit in us, we are able to require that our judgment should be universally valid. But, on the

other hand, because exactly the *same* part of the ideal is actualized in scarcely any other individual, this required accord is very seldom perfectly reached; and the æsthetic taste may be even more various than the judgment concerning many a thing that is merely agreeable to the senses, for whose impression all individuals possess the same susceptibility.

§ 3. As far as yet appears, therefore, the beautiful would be that which corresponds to so much of the ideal as is actualized in us. But the question arises, how beauty, which is so often found in external forms, can correspond to an ideal condition of the human spirit, which it is customary to conceive of only in the narrower domain of ethical sentiment.

It is obvious, however, that every single moral idea — for example, the idea of justness, kindness, etc. — as soon as it commands the spirit, is not merely bound to impart definite formal characteristics to our whole manner of conduct; but also that under its command, the interchange of different moods of mind and the habits of the mental train — in brief, the whole inner condition — may become habituated to definite forms of alteration; and that these, quite apart from all reference to ethical problems, may recur as forms for the combination of matters

in nature and in the products of art. Thus 'justness,' for example, is the formal predicate of consistency, of steadfast development, of the avoidance of everything superfluous, of the rigor and acerbity of stiff rectilinear forward movements. On the other hand, the idea of 'kindness' suggests the habit of equalizing opposites by intermediation, of avoiding all sharp contrast, and evoking like forms of demeanor. Both kinds of forms, however, we find again in nature also; and what either of them supports is pleasant besides to the one spiritual bent which lives in the same forms.

§ 4. Such a mode of apprehending the subject would, in part, — as will be shown subsequently — explain many particulars very well; and, in part, it would by no means ill defend the higher-worth of the beautiful in contrast with the agreeable.

But in all this the beautiful object would always appear only as a *means* which is good simply in order to produce by its influence upon us, and in us alone, that feeling of pleasure for the sake of which we call it 'beautiful.' *In itself*, accordingly, it would just as little be 'beautiful' as an object is in itself 'useful.' As 'usefulness' is simply a predicate signifying an event which happens to a thing in case it acts upon us, but which does not at all, like its other

properties, help to make out or characterize its own nature; just so beauty would be a predicate signifying an event, which does not belong, strictly speaking, to the constitution of the object itself, but which only happens to it because we, upon whom it acts, are so organized that this action causes us pleasure. If *we* were differently contrived, then the same object might possibly be called 'hateful'; and in such case it would just as little exist at all, as in the first case it would be in itself 'beautiful.'

In this way, therefore, 'beauty' would—strictly speaking—exist only in our subjective impression; in objects, on the contrary, there would be extant only a certain quantum of indifferent properties which produce the beautiful in us simply as their after-effect.

§ 5. The foregoing view will not be found satisfactory. If it is cheerfully conceded that so the matter must stand with other properties—for example, usefulness; and that these are therefore nothing which helps to constitute the object, but merely an accidental relation of the ready-made object to us; still this is impossible in the case supposed above; because the peculiar value of beauty is lost as soon as it is assumed not to be valid as the proper life of the object, but only as a state of mind induced by it.

The attempt will accordingly be made in every way to secure for beauty some *objective* reality; and likewise to require that the beauty of all which is beautiful be everywhere one and the same. For this, too, would be contradictory to its real worth, if, as is the case with what is merely useful, every single beautiful object were beautiful for a reason quite special to it, valid merely for it, and repeated in no other case. From such a necessity as this did the inquiry originate, which was started even in antiquity, concerning the 'beautiful in itself'; or in modern form concerning the 'idea of beauty.'

§ 6. In this effort to objectify beauty, no equivalent can be discovered for the pleasure of the subjective impression which it affords us; even if it be granted that things enjoy their own beauty. The attempt may, however, be made to apprehend that which *objectively*, in the things, lies at the basis of the beautiful impression, as a predicate significant in itself, inserted as of great worth into the entire structure of the world, and belonging to the world's completeness; so that the impression of beauty is produced by something that is, apart from the world and even in itself, of absolute worth.

§ 7. On the other hand, we soon become convinced that what we are looking for as the 'beautiful

in itself,' as a common characteristic in the different beautiful objects, can neither be a definite property nor a sum of such properties, neither a definite occurrence nor a reference,—a relation, nor yet a general exponent of such relations. For beautiful objects are infinitely various, as well in respect to the nature of their particular marks, as touching the mode of their combination.

Accordingly, we cannot apprehend 'the beautiful' in the form of an intuition, which would always give us only one definite image; nor in the form of the concept, which, in addition to a definite circle of marks, would give us an invariable law for their inner connection; but only in the form of an *Idea*. Such Idea furnishes the essentials of an object simply by means of the significance of the end to which it is called; and, on the contrary, does not include a definite form or combination of marks, but rather admits of an infinitely manifold determinableness, with the sole condition that in all these many forms the meaning of the end remains unchanged.

§ 8. It will now be our task to specify the content which constitutes beauty as conceived of under this form of the Idea. Now we have previously seen (§ 6) that an absolute worth can be attributed to the beautiful only in case the relations, by means of which it

is beautiful, belong to the universal, eternal, and most important connections of reality. But reality manifests to us three realms or powers that involve one another, namely:—

1. The realm of universal laws, which impress themselves upon us as of binding force with an absolute necessity, which rule all that is real, but on account of this very universality produce of themselves nothing definite whatever;

2. The realm of real substances and forces, which presents itself not as necessary but only as existent in fact, and which, by being active according to the aforesaid laws under definite circumstances, produces the manifold forms of phenomena;

3. The definite and specific plan according to which these elements of reality are brought together under each other, in order to realize a definite end by their action according to the universal laws.

§ 9. Now the foregoing three principles appear to our ordinary conception of the world to spring from different sources quite independently of each other, and only to traverse one another, and unite with one another, for the production of the aforesaid definite reality. None of them, however, flows from any other. From the realm of laws it is not deducible that there must be precisely *this* and no other form

of reality; and even from the end served we cannot demonstrate that it was to be attained only by means of *these* laws and forces and by means of no others.

But with such a triplicity of independent beginnings, we are neither satisfied in ordinary life nor in science; and it has always been one of the most serious problems of speculation to apprehend them all as necessary consequences of a single supreme principle.

In general, it can only be said, that this problem has never been completely solved, and never will be solved. Between cognition, however, which fruitlessly seeks for a complete insight into this connection, and conduct which just as imperfectly endeavors to bring about a unity of all that is real with its purposes,—and, therefore, between the realm of the true and the good,—feeling intervenes in the impression of beauty, in a peculiar manner; not, indeed, so as to furnish any theoretical insight or practical accomplishment of a solution of these contradictions, and yet so as to obtain in the intuition of the beautiful an immediate certainty and assurance of the existence of such a solution.

We can therefore designate beauty, in a preliminary way, as the appearance to immediate intuition of a unity amongst those three powers which our cognition is unable completely to unite.

§ 10. In every realization of an end which must employ means furnished from without in order to actualize it, such means will always possess, besides those properties through which they fulfil the demands of this end, still others that are in part neutral and in part obstructive. Only in the *totality of the world*, which is self-formed, are we able to presuppose a perfect congruity between the end to be fulfilled, the free activity of the means, and the general laws of their action.

Where the same congruity, which we have here no right to presuppose, nevertheless actually occurs in a single phenomenon; and, accordingly, where the means employed do not simply appear as *ab extra* and partially subjected to the end, but from their own inclination, and even in those relations in which it makes no demands upon them, are still active with the end in mind, as it were, and without compulsion repeat the forms of existence and occurrence that are otherwise required by it: there the object appears to us to achieve *more* than was its duty. And when it excites in us the feeling of pleasure through this superfluity of interior excellence, we call it *beautiful*; because it repeats in a picture that we can intuit and as concentrated in the small, the general Idea of Beauty, — the Idea, that is, of that perfect reciprocal involution, which belongs to the aforesaid three powers in the structure of the world.

§ 11. What precedes will suffice to separate the beautiful, as well in our immediate apprehension in life as also in art-criticism, from the following three things:—

1. From what is merely correct, true, or right—that is to say, from that which only corresponds perfectly to general laws and so does only its duty;

2. From the merely manifold life of the actual, which by its variety, its freshness, its surprising forms, acts upon us, psychologically considered, with great strength, but is in itself without worth, so that everything in art which is merely true to nature and characteristic can avail only as a material means of excitement and not as a justifying reason for our being pleased æsthetically;

3. Finally, from the good, which although higher than the beautiful, is not in and of itself also beautiful, but first becomes 'beautiful' in the course of its actualization, at the point where the free means complaisantly subject themselves to it, or it is itself in condition to be the complete solvent of their original rigidity.

§ 12. Now if beauty is a coincidence of the aforesaid three factors, which appear in the realization of every end, then it will belong, strictly speaking, only to what is *moved*; or to that whose condition, when

quiet in fact, can indicate to us such motions as would show the complete reciprocal involution of the end, the means, and the general laws.

And, indeed, beauty in the fullest sense would belong only to the creative soul of the world when moved, and might be designated as the form of its development; for only in the totality of the world does the aforesaid coincidence take place perfectly.

Individual objects, on the other hand, would either be beautiful through their bearing in themselves, in like manner, an active, animating principle, such as the 'world-soul' is to its totality; or else they are beautiful,—although being in themselves indeed only mechanical and external compositions from separate parts,—through their reminding us, by the form of their combination, of realities that are products of the world-soul in the same forms. It is due to the first reason that the living organism appears to us as the most direct exhibition of beauty; and to the second, that we endeavor to apprehend every possible work of art as an organism, in order to be able to point out its beauty in like manner.

§ 13. Little as we are able to express at all adequately the supreme end of the world, still it cannot consist, if we are only to consider it as having an

absolute value, in the representation of any event whatever, or of any fact, or in the execution of any form whatever either of movement or of existence. For all this—the unremitting manifestation of the Infinite in innumerable finite forms, the constant realizing of the Ideal and the re-idealizing of the Real, or, finally, the self-objectifying of a Spirit which unceasingly produces a world from itself and withdraws it again into itself—all this, by which it has been thought possible to express the supreme content of the world, is of itself a matter of perfect indifference, tedious and worthless; and one would not know why just this, rather than some other, must needs be the final purpose of the world.

Nothing else affirms itself so unconditionally and so immediately in respect to its value, as *happiness*. Only *it* has valid claim as the ultimate thing to be realized; only in regard to *it* is the question absurd, why it instead of unhappiness must be the final purpose of the world.

What usually causes this conception to be distrusted, is simply the subordinate thought of the individual, empirical, conditioned, and revocable happiness, that is sought for by the individual with egoistic intention and without respect to the question whether it is compatible with the happiness of the whole; and which is self-punished just on account

of this fact, since the coherent system of the whole of the world, placed beyond the range of its vision, avenges itself through the consequences. Widely different from such conditioned happiness is that which, having reference to the whole of the world, is better designated by the name of 'blessedness,' and so expresses the sequence of an ordering of the world in which there is no being, no relation, and no event, that is existent as bare matter of fact. The rather, in such an ordering of the world does everything which *is*, stand in such relations that the most manifold, most extended, and most profound *enjoyment* for all the single elements originates from these relations.

§ 14. We must now concede that, just as we are in nowise able to deduce from one final purpose, the necessity that precisely these and no other means should be chosen for its actualization; so, also, are we unable to demonstrate how the realizing of the highest blessedness demanded precisely this definite arrangement of the world, of which at least a fragment falls into our experience.

Indeed, in the second place, we are not in position for a moment to demonstrate that the world as it is corresponds to the aforesaid final purpose. The rather are we frequently brought by our survey of

the evil in the world to the belief that, if such blessedness is the final purpose of the world, it at least finds in the existent reality an imperfect and awkward means for its realization; so that even here there seems to be a chasm existing between the realm of ideas or final purposes and the realm of real means. Accordingly, the latter seem to spring from another source than the former.

In our theoretic cognition we shall never get further than a faith founded on certain *motifs*, that, nevertheless, in the totality of the world this perfect concord does take place; and that only the individual as such does penance for the fault of its finiteness by experiencing a transitory dissonance, which will be again dissolved in the harmony of the whole. On the contrary, wherever in a single phenomenon such an arrangement takes place that all its parts are not only in general complaisantly subjected to a single end, but are more especially productive by their reciprocal action of a manifold pleasure, that has its echo in each particular part and spreads harmoniously through the whole; there do we discover again in this *beauty* of the phenomenon the immediate assurance of the truth, that, as here in what is particular, so also in the whole of the world's ordering, the aforesaid opposition is annulled.

§ 15. Now enjoyment or happiness is possible only in beings with a *soul*. The highest objective beauty will, accordingly, always be found in the form that has soul, whose single parts we consider on that account as capable of having a share in the pleasure of the individual spirit that controls them, of feeling the happiness that is involved in the relations of each of them to every other; and so, from their point of view, of reflecting the harmony that pervades the whole as a whole, as though it existed for themselves.

On this account, every æsthetic consideration of nature will always be opposed to regarding, in a roughly mechanical view, the body as dead material for the purposes of the one living soul. Not only will it consider the body as animated in every part throughout, but also every work of art, however completely we may be convinced of its really mechanical structure, we shall value æsthetically only by considering it as animated organism; so as, accordingly, to be in a position to ascribe to every single part, not merely the passive possession of certain forms, but likewise an enjoyment of the worth of these forms.

§ 16. Finally: we shall not ascribe the title of 'beauty' exclusively so much to the forms of existence and of mutual relation, which are in themselves merely preparatory for the subsequent self-enjoyment

of "Things." On the contrary, we shall include the latter also in the aforesaid title, and shall style 'beautiful' every blissful self-enjoyment, such as presumably belongs to the totality of the world on account of the perfect coincidence of all real means of actualization with the content of its final purpose; and such as, — although it can be disturbed within the individual (the finite) by means of those dissonances that can occur, and that ordinarily do in fact occur, in the realization of every purpose, — on the other hand, manifests itself in each of these finite individual phenomena (the beautiful objects), in the form of a concentrated expression that approximates perfection.

In the foregoing result, the earlier and *subjective*, and this subsequent, *objective* way of regarding the beautiful, coincide. For, primarily, we found beauty to consist only in the subjective feeling of æsthetic pleasure, which the impressions stirred in us. We then required an objective existence to be given to it, so that it might appear as the peculiar inner essence of beautiful objects. We have attained this requirement, when we have considered beauty, not as a bare relation, as a bare form, of which the things to which it belongs are themselves not conscious; since we, the rather, explain it as the pleasure which the objects themselves receive from the happy construction of their forms. They, therefore, do not merely

appear beautiful, in so far as they make on us a pleasing impression; but we, in the impression, only share with them in their own beautiful feeling of pleasure.

§ 17. By the term 'fancy' we designate, in contrast with the common power of imagination,—which only brings to the mind's view a manifold matter of fact having various marks, forms, relations, etc.,—the higher capacity, that likewise feels the value in these matters of fact, which they possess for the soul that enjoys them. Various expressions of this 'fancy' occur in the most ordinary spiritual life; and we cannot even mentally represent the most abstract concepts (like unity, opposition, equilibrium, and the like) without likewise transposing ourselves with our mind into their content, and sympathetically enjoying the peculiarly colored pleasure or pain which corresponds to it. But 'fancy' will appear not merely as an *apprehending* activity, which discovers the world of values within the world of forms, and beholds the former everywhere shining through the latter; but will likewise appear as a *creative* activity, which is able to transport the inner world of values into the world of forms.

Thus would the 'fancy' of the soul's creative world be the source of all beauty; for it is this

living activity, from which the ideal ends and the realizing manifestation of them proceed in immediate unity. In the 'fancy' of the human spirit we discover it again active in painstaking of twofold form: partly in joyfully understanding the beauty that exists; partly in bringing forth other beauty with the self-productivity of art.

4785

THE RAMAKRISHNA MISSION
INSTITUTE OF CULTURE
LIBRARY

CHAPTER II.

THE ACTUALIZATION OF THE BEAUTIFUL, AND ITS KINDS.

§ 18. If we investigate those domains of reality in which beauty can manifest itself, we are able to distinguish, —

(1) The universal forms of Space, Time, and Motion, upon which all reality is built ; — further,

(2) The definite typical species of individual and actual beings ; — finally,

(3) The world of events, into which the latter are interwoven.

§ 19. While forbearing until later all allusion to the grounds on which certain individual forms of space, time, and motion appear beautiful rather than others, we wish now to present that on which the beautiful impression of each one of these forms always depends.

Space, time, and motion, are so organized interiorly, that they not only comprehend one immensity by means of their infinite extent, but by means of their relations under law likewise give to each single point some definite relation in a series of relations

to every other point. Thus space, for example, makes it possible that nothing in the world stand isolated, but everything have its own definite surroundings; that motions in different directions converge at one point previously determined, or diverge from some other common point; that every figure when begun finds not merely a place for its conclusion, but also the points fixed by a law through which its outline must run symmetrically;—and more of the same kind of thing.

We are so wonted to all these properties that we overlook their value. Nevertheless, the impression exerted upon us—for example, by the symmetry of a figure, by the consistency in the curvature of a line, by the peculiar contrast between the two equal branches of an arabesque that run right and left, by the fixed recurrence of a melody to its point of starting—depends in large measure upon the fact that all these individual phenomena secretly remind us of this universal nature of the aforesaid three great forms, by means of which consistency, coherence, possibility of a development, and the impossibility of ever withdrawing one's self from the close union with reality, are everywhere secured.

§ 20. In contrast with the 'free beauty' that, in this first province, enters into various combinations

in themselves purposeless, everything actual, being fixed by some conception of species, has first to satisfy the demands of this type. Yet it is not by this means alone made 'beautiful.' For every type, like every general notion, leaves indefinite a great number of proportions between its individual marks. These gaps the individual must fill up by the choice of definite relations; and only thus does the generic type have any actuality whatever.

Now the individual will be *beautiful* in case it perfects these its individual features, not only in accord with one another, but also in such manner that by means of them, in respect to the proper significance of the type, it surpasses its necessary demands. It thereby shows how the excellence of this type is preserved even for its own individual end as a self-sufficing system of means. Conversely, it becomes positively hateful, so soon as it defines that which the general type leaves indefinite, *contrary* to its significance. For in this way, although it does not escape from the limits of what is matter of command, still it shows that it feels itself to be ruled by the generic type as by a foreign power, to which it is opposed with its own individual inclinations and purposes.

The attempt to discover or represent simply the universal type as beautiful in itself, without any

such individual and characteristic coloring, will necessarily be wrecked. That which is properly contrasted with the 'merely characteristic' as being the 'ideally beautiful,' is not attained by complete surrender of what is characteristic; but only by making the specifically individual directions, for which we conceive the generic type to be perfected and exercised in the individual form, of themselves more comprehensive, free, and universal; so that they include no limited construction merely, but a manifoldness of purposes—and that of such kind as belong to the actual and serious vital problems of the genus.

The fact need scarcely be alluded to, that 'characteristic beauty' may include also the 'free beauty' of mere form; although in all higher creations the forms of themselves are more simple and quiet, while their beauty depends on the understanding of their ever-increasing spiritual content.

§ 21. Beauty in the world of events lies in the concord between the free characteristic activity of manifold living being, and the universal laws of the environing world-plan. Here there may be, in part, such a 'free' beauty of *grace* that the events act by means of the beauty of the form of their concatenation; in part, a 'characteristic' beauty, since a

definite individual form of life is developed, in accordance with its own nature, by all the events to which it is subjected from without.

Peculiar to this domain, however, and only transferable from it to the earlier ones, is the form of *sublimity*. It accompanies of itself every great historical survey of the world's destiny. It appears in the individual, where some more than ordinarily conspicuous cycle of events, as a smaller whole, brings to the mind's view the unconditioned control of the universal over the activity of the particular.

Nevertheless, the impression of this absolute reign of laws, as long as weight is laid upon the vanishing of the particular before the universal, has at first only a depressing effect; and it is in no respect *beautiful* except as this reign of law is not held to be the finality in the world, but only a means of which an unspeakably higher power avails itself for binding together what is manifold. On the other hand, the same impression becomes dreadful, so soon as the mechanism of this conformity to law is made to hold good as a final and supreme fate, which controls all that is finite without being itself limited by anything higher.

On the other hand, what is itself elevated is also elevating; if one lays weight upon the other side, upon the inexhaustible procession of the individual

from the universal, and upon the love with which the latter constantly anew produces what is perishable. Still even what is elevated is *beautiful* only in case this immeasurable power of production is itself again tacitly assumed to be the means for a higher end. On the other hand, if it were to take rank as a finality, it would be transformed for us into the tedium of the monotone.

The supreme beauty of events will accordingly consist in the solemn sublimity in which the force that negates the individual, as well as the other that is infinitively creative, appears as the peculiar life-likeness of a purpose, in itself valuable and sacred.

§ 22. Now just as fancy apprehends these forms of the beautiful in the reality of the world as it is, so does it endeavor to reproduce them in art.

The earliest beginnings of art belong to daily life. Every impulse toward cleanliness, adornment, order and comfort in surroundings, is dependent on the same pleasure in the opulency of that which is manifold yet concordant, that ventures on higher problems in the sphere of "*art*" customarily so called. And it certainly would be profitable — contrary to modern æsthetics which, for the most part, aims to be 'a science of the idea of the beautiful' — to consider all art scientifically as an element in the history

of culture. The problem of what we are wont to call 'art' in the narrower meaning accordingly consists, in general, in the reproduction of actuality; not, however, of individual actuality as such, but of the *totality* of what is actual. That is to say, art must make obvious, in every exhibition of it, the structure of the actual world, the forms of its connection, and the absolute value and significance of these forms. It has, therefore, not so much to idealize, and not to improve, the content of the actual. It has only to concentrate what, in the infinite extension of the world, lies so scattered far apart in space and time that it can neither be contemplated in the significance and value of its coherency by the individual mind; nor yet clearly enough surveyed by reflexion; nor, finally, enjoyed in immediate and living experience.

§ 23. The conditions, which art must satisfy in order to effect an impression of beauty,¹ fall under three classes, corresponding to the three measures in us to which the works of art must be applied. For they must —

1. Please the Senses; and so there indubitably arises a series of *physiological* conditions of beauty,

¹ Comp. H. Lotze, *On the Conditions of the Beautiful in Art.* — Göttinger Studien, 1847, II. 1.

thus far little studied, which not merely concern the harmony of sensuous impressions with one another (colors, tones), but also have control in the involuntary symbolism by which we, with the common feeling of our body, with the pleasure and pain that proceed from its motions, positions, its equipoise or pressure, first learn besides to understand every other combination of spatial forms and motions, and to estimate the harmony or dissonance in their size and peculiarities. The work of art must —

2. Satisfy all the general Laws, which control the course of our ideas, feelings, and acts of will, and which are everywhere the same without regard to the content and value of what is mentally represented. This gives us the *psychological* conditions of beauty; which will sometimes most effectively proceed from the uniformity of one mood excited in us, sometimes from its vicissitudes, sometimes from steadfast appeal to motive, sometimes from a leap by way of contrast, sometimes from broad and explicit representation, sometimes from brief and aphoristic indication. Our soul, however, in case it has to do with æsthetic enjoyment and artistic work, is no longer an otherwise empty existence, that possesses these laws of its inner mechanism simply for some future use; but by experience, cognition, and conduct, it has developed into a capacious spirit, which has formed

for itself a firm reflective view concerning the content, connection, and value of the world. 1785

3. To this Spirit also must the work of art correspond; and it fulfils these last ideal conditions of beauty by being constantly mindful, in some manner or other, of those three great forces on which the world is built, and of their harmony, wherein precisely lies the secret of the world. Every work of art must, therefore, be mindful —

(a) of a circle of general laws that are valid even beyond its own peculiar limits. Just by this means will it show that it is not a dream void of all real being, but a part or picture of reality. It must —

(b) bring before us a definite, specific, and concrete form of life that, although it follows the afore-said laws, does not follow from them alone. It must, finally —

(c) cause this form of life to appear to us as taken up into, and set in place within, a capacious plan of the world, to the fulfilment of which it contributes something with the forces of its own concrete nature.

SECOND PRINCIPAL DIVISION.

;

SECOND PRINCIPAL DIVISION.



CHAPTER III.

MUSIC.

§ 24. Tones are not, like colors, phenomena which (at least apparently) are attached to objects as their predicates, but they are immediately experienced as *events*, which proceed from resounding bodies and betray to us the motion of their interior parts. They are therefore in all respects adapted to the expression of the interior life of the spirit, and do not represent 'Things' according to their external appearance, but betray to us immediately that essential interior condition of the things which produces this appearance. Tones are moreover—since they can never be thought of as not in time-form—the natural symbol for all activity that fills up time, for all becoming, beginning, and ceasing to be.

Finally, since they are subject to innumerable gradations of intensity, they have the power of imitating, in the most manifold forms of crescendo and diminuendo, all those formal predicates of consist-

ency and firmness, of yielding and transition, of gradual movement of will and sudden bound, of elasticity and sleepiness, which exist in every spiritual life as possible forms of its course, that are of the greatest significance.

§ 25. Of even greater importance are the qualitative relations of the different tones.

But it is of no æsthetic interest to discourse of the acoustic or physiological foundation for the internal ordering of the 'scale'; because none of these mathematical relations as such appear in our experience.

What is important is rather precisely this, that the ascending series of the number of vibrations be experienced by us, not as a series of numbers, but as an increasing pitch of the tone. For in this so-called quality of 'pitch' lies the expression, so infinitely significant æsthetically considered, of one power surpassing another (that is, a 'lower tone'), not by a mere degree of some unchanging content, but by a difference that is *qualitative* and yet measurable as a definite advance over that other. No other form of sensation so manifestly secures this expression of a 'qualitative magnitude,' which, however, as is self-evident, comes significantly to view in innumerable places in our spiritual life.

The second feature in the series of tones, which has an æsthetic effect, is the existence of harmonies. The scale does not simply proceed onward in a right line; but between its individual steps there appear peculiar relations, which frequently bind the remote more closely together than the neighboring parts in the scale. Finally, by the existence of octaves, and by the recurrence of the same interior harmonious relations, the realm of tones is made into a whole closed off, as it were; which indeed as a whole can be repeated in higher and lower position along the scale, but which possesses a number of interior relations that are established by law, instead of an immeasurable and unlimited quantity. In this way it produces an impression similar to that of space, with the consistency of its interior relations established by law.

Finally, no tone can exist without the peculiar 'coloring' which depends upon the nature of the instrument that sounds it; and this gives to the art a means for introducing into its productions an original, indefinable, and yet noteworthy individuality.

§ 26. Now if we inquire, what is done with this material in the world of tone, we shall see that the first demand made upon every work of art (§ 23, 3a) — the indicating of a realm of general laws that hold

good not for it exclusively, but quite as much for innumerable other phenomena besides—is fulfilled by the application of musical time. That is to say, as a measure whose periods are not directed toward the content of the music, but produce in it their cæsuras with a complete indifference to this content, musical time appears as the universal fate which, in its own conformity to law, comprises everything finite, yet without having more preference for any one than for another.

The application of musical time, like the metre of poetry, will be different according to the impression designed. It should wholly avoid producing the unartistic, distressing, elementary impression, which the tones of nature, for example, make. Especially to accentuate the musical time sharpens, to be sure, the impression of universal conformity to law. But this will sometimes be elevated, where the music expresses the voluntary subjection of an activity in itself capable beneath a fate in itself severe (martial music); sometimes absolutely tedious, where (as in dance-music) a content that is nothing in itself appears to accommodate itself to the endless customary loitering by the way. Religious music requires a retreating into the background of musical time, both in the composition and in the rendering, such as shall express that which is of itself law; and other

music (as the recitative) there is, which expressly designs by preference to enter upon some individual course of development, and would be disturbed by being reminded of its nothingness in the presence of the general law.

§ 27. The second thing which should be required (see § 23, 3 *b*) is the specific lifelikeness that develops itself within the aforesaid limits. We find it of course in melody. But this of itself we cannot hold to be anything else but a resolution of a simple chord, — at least in its simplest examples. Just as a specific type lies at the foundation, as it were, of every living creation, and this type is developed and employed by all its subsequent movements and actions, in a way individually characteristic; just so does melody appear as an individual and characteristic tendency to develop and clearly indicate the relations that lie in the harmony of the chord.

The mere moveableness of tones in this direction and in that, would make no more musical impression than do the noises of nature in which the greatest manifoldness of vicissitude prevails. But the latter do not proceed from one fundamental tone, nor confine themselves within the typical species of a single key. Their tones do not occur as intermediate members and as preparatory to the discovering of

harmonious intervals upon which, as upon firm points, they can come to a rest. Finally, they do not recur to a single fundamental tone; and, on this account, they do not give the impression of a development which, although free, is still organized by means of the idea of species. Melody accomplishes all this; and its impression is completely bound to the fact, that the course of the tones does not run into 'the immeasurable blue,' as it were, but gravitates constantly about the elements of some original chord, as about the source of all their lifelikeness.

§ 28. Now the essential element of melody consists, of course, in the special form of the movement with which it weaves itself about the firmly fixed tones of its chord.

Accordingly, although the peculiar charm of a certain melody can never be exhausted by logical considerations, yet music employs a number of progressive tropes that may be used with frequent repetition, the æsthetic expression of which it must be possible to refer back to some one thought,—a thing thus far little done.

Thus, for example, running through the entire scale in a straight line, especially where it occurs as a contrast to the more intricate movements of the melody, will have its effect by means of its forceful

and yet simple reminder of the regular articulation of the tones belonging to the key. Just so will the division of an interval by one or more harmonious intermediate tones, which serve the melody as points of starting for the minor and secondary movements, make the richness and solidity of this articulation yet more impressive. Further, the custom of not reaching at once the tone which it is sought to reach by successive bounds, as it were, but of resting for a moment on the next higher or lower tone and afterward attaining that, obviously has such a peculiar effect because it is the universal way in which vital energies act, in contrast to unconsciously mechanical ones; which latter reach their goal without making any circuit, while the former are taking a course too long or too short.

Any such reduction of musical tropes to the reasons for their æsthetic impression would be, of course, pre-eminently valuable with reference to the rules of composition, by which the simple elementary melodies are themselves developed into a greater and more artistic whole.

§ 29. In the development of the melody the transition into another key that is fixed according to well-known laws, with a final recurrence to the previous one, is a condition necessary for our æsthetic satisfaction.

On what this necessity of feeling depends is obscure ; not so, however, the reason for the æsthetic impression which the use of these transitions produces. The latter consists in this, that here, as in all other arts, the regular structure of a whole occurs much more effectively in case it is apprehended not merely in its original proportions, — that is to say, in those which necessarily belong to its content, — but also under such conditions as threaten to disturb, and yet do not actually disturb its equilibrium ; since it withdraws from this deviation with perfect elasticity into its earlier form, or by alterations of an opposite kind compensates for the impression of the single disturbance.

§ 30. In addition to those means which lie strictly within the nature of tones, there are manifold relations of metre in which far more general demands of feeling, such as recur in all the other arts, find their expression. Thus it is necessary that the melody should not merely return in general to its fundamental tone, but that its way back from the farthest point of deviation should, in outward extent (and therefore in duration of time), hold an even balance, as it were, with its way thither ; and besides that it should not travel back in wholly new and unrelated forms of movement, but should repeat in inverse

order the forms of the way outward, — a demand which we make, for example, on the right and left branches of an arabesque, and things of that kind.

By the foregoing metrical means, which may also be observed in the metres of poetry, an immeasurable diversity is possible for the inner development of melody as well. But upon this subject it is here impossible to enter more particularly.

§ 31. The third requirement (§ 23, 3c), — namely, of exhibiting the movements of some specific form of life in its concord with a higher plan that determines it, — is fulfilled within the limits of a simple melody by its coincidence with an harmonious accompaniment fitted to it. As long as this consists in nothing more than in repeatedly striking, together with the fundamental tones of the melody, the chords in whose successive development the melody itself consists, we receive only the simple impression of an elementary necessity with which the individual harmonizes. The higher forms of music must pass from this to the vivifying of the accompaniment itself, and thereby make the transition to a weaving together of different melodies, for whose connection we are able to establish only very few general æsthetic points of view. In what way the melody, by being carried over into another pitch, key, rhythm ; by manifold

repetition of the *motif* lying within it; finally, by combination, intersection, and elaboration in company with others originally foreign to it, can be developed into a larger whole, must be left to the technical theory of music.

§ 32. Finally, if the question is asked, What are the precise problems for music to solve? — then it is obvious, in the first place, that it should never try to depict concrete forms, definite conditions and events; since no combination of tones is able to express a specific conception or one of those definite relations which, in the structure of the sentence, language indicates by inflections and particles. The intelligibility of every event, however, depends directly upon the sharp delineation of these points of relation.

Of all natural events, the rather, it is only the form of their flow and the combination of their single elements with each other, which music is able to imitate by similar combinations between the tones. Accordingly, since it leaves out the definite content of what is to be imitated, the form of motion, to which alone it holds fast, will always be something more general than what is imitated; and the fancy will not be reminded of this *exclusively*, but of all the different phenomena or forces which are active in this same general form, in all their variety.

On this account music is everywhere adapted for the expression of that supersensible and universal force, which is indeed capable of producing special forms from itself, but has never as yet actually produced them.

§ 33. It is further obvious that music cannot transmit ready-made feelings, but only tropes of tone. By this means it primarily depicts only the *form of existence* belonging to some actual thing or some event; while it cannot express exactly the peculiar content of a definite feeling by means of these tropes alone. There is no doubt that the same melody often admits equally well of being adapted to quite opposite states of mind, to pleasure and despair, to rage and love. Even in this case, therefore, it does not depict these feelings directly, but only the form which they have as movements of our mind;—for example, the stability or instability, the greater or less velocity and elasticity, the greater or smaller wealth in the vicissitudes of the inner states which are wont to be combined with a feeling, and with respect to which, pleasure and despair, anger and love, may be constructed entirely alike.

If therefore we give the name of 'feelings' only to those definite states that refer to just as definite objects, recollections, or expectations, then music

cannot set them forth; but it will—just as in the foregoing case—express something *more general*, and therefore remind the listener, according to the accidental direction of his own course of thought, sometimes of this and sometimes of that concrete feeling.

§ 34. Still it would not be correct to draw the inference from the foregoing, that music in general has neither the capacity nor the task of producing feeling. For that which it does immediately furnish, —namely, the general forms of combination, of stability or dismemberment, of consistency or arbitrariness, of strenuousness or yielding, of harmonious advance and digression, and, finally, the possibility of returning again from this variety to a regular development;—all these forms are not merely an entertaining spectacle for our indifferent *cognition*. On the contrary, they cannot themselves be represented in such abstract enumeration without at the same time reminding us of the deep enjoyment which lies just in the possibility and in the actual control of such forms over the world's onward movement.

It is, therefore, not merely as forms in themselves worthless, that the aforesaid 'tropes of tone,' remind us of the valuable content which is actualized in the

world within them ; but these 'tropes' appear (that is to say, where, as in music, they meet us with such variety of phenomena presented to our view) as furnishing immediately in themselves a foundation of absolute value, upon which every other concrete enjoyment or feeling can be developed.

§ 35. Thus music accomplishes in the most forcible manner a problem which it is possible for the rest of the arts to accomplish only approximately. That is to say, although we concede that our definite human organization, and the just as definite formation of the external world with which we are in reciprocal action, first make possible for us a great part of our most valuable inner development and of our external good fortune ; yet this organization is, on the other hand, a limitation for us which hinders us from transposing ourselves into the interior of creatures that are of a wholly different kind from us, or of enjoying somewhat of the dream-life which we assume to exist everywhere throughout the world, even in what is not alive.

Music overcomes the above-mentioned limit. While it is, on the one hand, wholly incapable of representing the concrete specific types and forms of events in the created world, the *natura naturata* ; it is so much the more suited to depict how the inner

life and movement of the creative world, the *natura naturans*, or that all-penetrating world-soul, without as yet creating anything definite, sportively rejoices in the infinite variety, mobility, and harmony of its creative forces.

In this way music is, in some sort, pre-eminently qualified for giving to the life that is merely directed outward, a counterpoise by way of sinking it in the divine which lies at the foundation of all that is individual; but just so is the danger incurred of exercising an enervating influence upon the culture of the spirit by constant deviation from those sharply outlined forms of actuality which are the objects of our conduct.

CHAPTER IV.

ARCHITECTURE.

§ 36. Architecture is indeed defined by its aims ; but its artistic stamp need express nothing more than the general character of these aims, — for example, the military, the ecclesiastical, etc. On this account it is limited in the development of its forms only by the most general problem, of effecting the enclosure of a space and, at most, covering it with a roof.

Since it can do this only by means of ponderous masses, all its forms act not by their mere stereometric or picturesque beauty, but simply by the mechanical significance which they have as massive forms ; because they indicate the directions in which either gravity or the forces that resist it are effective.

So long as such single lines of force as, taken in relation to one another, secure the impression of an organic system of co-operating activities, are not distinguished in any structure, so long it does not fall within the domain of *architecture*, and has only a value in the history of human culture (as do, for

example, the pyramids). The special art always begins with this organizing ; since it —

1. Through manifold forms reminds us of the universal *law* of gravity, to which the entire life of architecture and at the same time of all the rest of nature is subjected, and to which it is directly attached as a part of reality ; since it, —

2. In respect to what we call '*style*,' distinctly bears the stamp of a specific and consistently maintained custom of transition from one element to another, or from the support to the load ; finally, since it, —

3. In the '*plan*' of the building, effects the concentrating of the most manifold number possible of vital elements into a single organism that is a summary of them all.

§ 37. The first definitely cultivated '*style*,' that of the Greek columnar architecture, makes the opposition between support and load prominent in the structure as a whole, decidedly and without anything being interposed, — such interposition occurring only in the details.

To this end it divides the function of carrying among single supports, the columns ; whose force mounting upward vertically carries the load laid upon it at right angles, in the form of the entablature.

At the place where supports and load meet each other, the transition from the vertical to the horizontal is, of course, mediated by an oblique surface placed between, which is formed with a curvilinear outline, — the capital. But this intermediate member has such small dimensions that it does not annul the aforesaid principal opposition for the total aspect of the structure.

§ 38. In this style we find applied certain principles which, with little modification, must hold good for all styles of architecture.

In the first place, all the *lower* parts of the structure, as well as of the single column, are kept absolutely plain and simple. The richest development occurs, on the contrary, in the zone where the opposed forces come into conflict (capital and frieze — *κυμάτιον*).

We further find a prominence given to the line in which a force acts, by multiplication of the contours. So the fluting of the columns, the vertical slitting of the triglyphs, — by which means the expression of the supporting force is enhanced; while, on the contrary, a similar division of the load into horizontal layers diminishes the character of the load, since it awakens the impression of being reciprocally carried and of a less massive pressure on the supports (Ionic and Corinthian entablature).

Quite commonly we further see in such a case, as in ordinary life, great care applied to the clear delineation of the ends of each single member. Just as in household use, seam and border are employed for all possible outlines, edges, and circumferences, while the middle is left unadorned ; so do we see in architecture also *the end* of one member of the structure (for example, a column) shortly before its occurrence, indicated by several ornaments, bands, incisions, straps ; as well as the interval between two essentially different parts of the building expressly made prominent by a small low member projecting between them (a plate, *abacus* between column and entablature).

Further, in the outlines of the structure the interchange of members that spring back and forth in places where two principal parts abut on each other, is constantly employed ; just as in music, before the conclusion of the melody, the chord in which one is to come to the rest is several times repeated with variations from it. Especially necessary is a final projection of the lines of the load toward the sides beyond the edges of the support. This 'out-loading,' as it were, we find skilfully observed in all good works of this style ; while it is no longer necessary in like manner in other styles, whose fundamental thought is not that of such sharp opposition between force and load.

§ 39. As far as the ornaments are concerned, besides those which directly make prominent the constructive meaning of the individual members (for example, the fluting), we find a preference shown for covering the smaller parts intermediate between the principal ones, with ornaments partly painted and partly carved. Such ornaments in most cases support the 'profile line' of the member, being repeated along its length; and they by this means constantly produce a connected and progressive series of one and the same pattern (volute, fillets, egg-and-dart moulding, astragals, coronals, etc.).

Besides the foregoing, ornaments modelled with perfect freedom are found at only a few principal points, at the corners and peaks of the building (acroteria); and painted ornaments principally at the parts which do not belong to the essentially constructive framework, but to the smaller pieces designed for filling out the structure. Finally, the free spaces of the frieze and of the pediment are kept for plastic statues, while the constructive parts (like the shafts of the columns and the architrave) are covered with ornaments only in wholly barbaric times.

The zones of the most numerous and expressive ornaments run, therefore, along in the middle height of the entire building, at the place where the sup-

porting force of the columns meets the load of the entablature of the roof.

§ 40. On the whole, the Greek building with columns, on account of its thorough-going consistency in the constructive combination of the elements, its avoidance of everything arbitrary, its variety of the fairest proportions, its grace and correct employment of ornamentation, must be held to be an absolutely perfect solution for an architectonic problem that is in itself considered, however, only a small one.

That is to say, it cannot—strictly speaking—furnish anything more than a hall composed of columns for the æsthetic enclosure of a space. Even in the structure of the temple, it leaves the *house* proper, the ‘cella,’ æsthetically unorganized in its rear, and only appears as a beautiful decoration on the outside, in front of the temple itself.

It is hindered in its longitudinal extension from comprising very large spaces by the monotony of the columns, which are always repeated in the same way, and of the lines of the entablature that run on unbroken; and in its extension upward by the necessity of covering the space between two columns with a single stone, which admits of only a limited interval and, therefore, also of only a limited height of the columns: while, on the other hand, to place rows of

columns one above another does not make a satisfactory impression æsthetically; because, although the springing-forth of the lowest from the mass of the earth's surface is apparent, the origin of the second row from the entablature above the first is, on the contrary, obscure and surprising.

The fact of a right angle between columns and architrave led also to right-angled parallelogram ground-plans, in which one side was uniformly copied perfectly by the other and opposite side; and all projection or retreating of the other parts of the structure in peculiar lifelike annexes and corners, as well as all genuine architectonic grouping of essentially different members into an organic whole, was thereby excluded. In like manner also within the spatially very limited interior, no variety of perspective, no multiplicity of changeable aspects from different points of view, offered itself. In the same way, finally, on the outside the building possessed only at the pediment a prominent point, while everywhere else very beautiful elements were repeated in a somewhat monotonous manner.

This style is therefore wanting, not merely in variety, but also in tendency that way; and in all mysteriousness, such as was present—for example—in Egyptian architecture in far inferior forms, and was repeated in later styles, in better forms.

§ 41. The second general principle of architecture is that of the arch by which the roof is held together. For, of course, it can in the first instance be used only as a *roof*; since the æsthetic impression constantly demands that at least one stretch wide of material should vividly express by a vertical substructure the direct upward striving, as it were, of the force in opposition to gravity. The difference between the different styles of the arch depends principally upon the manner in which they dispose this substructure in combination with the arch which forms its conclusion.

The pressure sideways which every arch exerts upon its substructure makes its strengthening technically necessary; but this can be divided among single buttments separate from each other. In this way it leads of itself to centralized ground-plans; since these buttments are grouped around the principal bodies of the structure, and can then, after they are once there, easily be combined with each other into available spaces by further intermediate members. Hence proceeds forthwith an inclination to manifold grouping in the ground-plan, and a reason for the unequal extension of the heights of the single parts; as well as, in the interior, a variety of perspective through the multiplicity of the adjunct spaces as they are brought into combination with the principal space.

§ 42. The Roman architecture combined the structure of the arch which was derived from the Etruscans, with the Greek style, into a magnificent, impressive, but inorganic whole.

The substructure was massive masonry, on which columns appeared only as decorative elements in order to break up the otherwise unarticulated monotony, but without being designed to support anything in particular. They further appeared as a portico or pillared wall externally to the building itself.

Then on the substructure, almost wholly as one load, rests the arch, shaped for the most part like the hoop of a cask, and completely separated from the substructure by a jutting like an architrave which acts as its proximate support. In itself it is without any division to correspond to the meaning of its curvilinear surface, and is adorned for the most part with small caisson-like decorations.

The effect of all this was to render possible an interior architecture which, although it was not strictly speaking organic, was still very magnificent and powerful, such as was wanting to the Greek style. On the other hand, the Roman architecture neither discovered a new form for the exterior, nor did it hit upon one in harmony with the interior in what it borrowed from the Greek.

§ 43. The Byzantine style contains an advance in so far as it fashions for the arch separate special supports in the form of single strong aspiring pillars, and unites them with each other by immense bows. These props, too, finally support a horizontal entablature of semicircular form, beyond which they are not carried upward, but on which lies the flat and architecturally quite unarticulated vaulted dome, as though it were a new and foreign part.

The great dimensions of these domes, the glimpses into the half-domes that frequently intersect the principal dome and support a portion of its lateral thrust on secondary pillars, the communication of the principal space through the pillars with the secondary spaces, the arcades of columns which enliven the spaces intervening between the pillars, and the originally great gorgeousness of the material and adornment, — all produce an impression that is great indeed but picturesque rather than architectural; and neither in the exterior nor in the ornamentation did the Byzantine style develop forms at once beautiful and coherent with its ruling principle. Its further transformation and degeneration, respectively, in Russian architecture and in the Orient, has led to adventurous forms.

§ 44. The Romanesque style, which divides into very manifold varieties, as a rule carries its massive pillars upward not merely as supports, but makes them pass immediately over, without a common horizontal entablature, into mighty arches by which the single pillars are so bound together — and that diagonally — as to make the entire vault divide up into single arched hoods. These hoods now lie between the offshoots of the pillars as though to fill up the space, after the latter have delineated, as it were, the form of the structure up to its very conclusion in mid-air.

In a similar way the secondary spaces are arched over at a lower height. In connection with this stands the fact, that generally the circular form in the ground-plan (as well as in the roofing) no longer occurs as such, but is only indicated as broken up into a polygon (for the most part, eight-cornered). And the arches no longer appear as domes, but are for the most part covered by pyramids.

The circular bend of the arches is consistently employed in the entire structure, in portals, windows, etc.; and it is likewise repeated in extraordinary manifoldness of modelling as ornamentation everywhere.

In the forms of the exterior this style prefers an obvious prominence of forceful masses with large divisions, does not avoid horizontal entablatures,

but very frequently carries, even to the point of sacrificing beauty, the external marks of a structure built in stories (although this was sometimes not really so), every floor of which was, for the most part, designated by a cornice adorned with ornaments of circular bows.

§ 45. The æsthetic character of the Gothic style, apart from the historical properties which it assumed in its development, is rightly referred to the fact, that it secures simply the impression of a freely and actively aspiring force, yet scarcely that of a struggle of this force with a load foreign to itself. This impression depends upon the following elements:—

The pillars, which in the Romanesque style still maintained a simple prismatic form, acquired a more varied profile; since there appeared on their external surface slender half-columns, which, separated from each other by the surface being drawn in between them, indicate the main body of the pillar from below up to the lines in which the single forces united in it mount on high. From these columns the single ribs of the arch spring upward; not indeed, as in the Romanesque style, in the form of broad bands that have their broad side directed downward, but in the form of narrower bows of tolerably triangular section, which send downward a sharp corner that often

is made especially prominent by being tapered off. These single ribs or girders now spread out, crossing and subdividing, into a network often richly wrought out, in whose meshes the surfaces of the ceiling are so manifoldly dismembered and subdivided, as wholly to lose their character as an extended '*load*.'

On the exterior the roof, of course, forms a load ordinarily very massive ; but the remaining structure is so arranged that the horizontal line of the entablature is interrupted and concealed by a multitude of parts, towers and gables, arches over windows, etc. ; so that on the whole the impression arises of a force that everywhere surpasses the load.

The arrangement of the vault of the roof permitted its whole pressure to be concentrated upon the pillars, so that a strong counter-thrust was necessary for these alone. On this account single buttresses were formed, which shot forth from the external outline as distinct supporting forces ; while the dead masonry between them was made more and more to vanish. Mighty openings for windows assume their place ; and their empty space is subdivided by an even more richly wrought work of bars, both vertical and penetrating one above the other, after the pattern of the binders of the arch. It is often only this character of interrupted masses, which in smaller works produces the impression of the Gothic style ;

but to this must be added the general preference for making prominent the vertical and the avoidance of all strongly expressed horizontal lines; so that this style betrays itself in all manner of small works, patterns, and the like, through these mere relations of dimension.

Finally, the pointed bow is not unessential. Yet its form, fashioned from two intersecting arms, is not at all æsthetically adapted for bearing a load, but only for the expression of forces whose free endings die out, as it were, in one vertical resultant; while the curvature of the Romanesque circular bow, on the contrary, returning as it does upon itself, shows itself unadapted for serving as a termination of the structure, but only for the support of a load.

§ 46. Besides the circular bow and the ornaments formed from it, the Romanesque style employs antique forms pretty frequently, especially the shapes of cornice, the capitals less; and it seeks in general to produce in the arrangement of the entire structure a perspicuous and definite partition into surfaces that are large and easily definable with reference to each other; so that in this characteristic of perspicuity it most resembles the antique. On the interior, the large surfaces of the walls and ceiling, divided and limited by the main vaults of the roof, afford oppor-

tunity for a rich picturesque adornment, which is here of far more significance than the strictly architectural ornamentation.

The Gothic style cannot in the same way assume the antique forms. The columns, much prolonged in their height and mounting only as secondary upon larger pillar-formations, lose with their constructive significance also their earlier regular form, and are treated with free gracefulness, yet always as subordinate parts. A perfectly free but no longer constructive ornamentation comes to be very richly applied; but it dwindles in its dimensions almost wholly away in comparison with the great masses of the structure, and has the appearance only of a kind of secondary adornment, which is placed upon another species of ornamentation that is strictly architectural.

This latter decoration consists in the way in which the Gothic structure, in general, unlike the Romanesque, makes from the first the impression, not of a single individual life, but of an association of innumerable many beings, each of which has its own peculiar life, and yet is bound with the others into the unity of one plan and thereby also articulated with itself and, finally, freely terminated, as it were. We mean to say that, on the exterior, this impression is effected by

the various ascending pillars, towers, and gables, which collectively appear according to the general principle of the style as aggregates of single parts; and which, at different altitudes, separate from the whole and terminate, and so cause their own parts to terminate, at different altitudes.

On the other hand, both styles agree in the care with which they treat the windows and doors, not as mere openings in the walls, but give to them a limitation that is definite, adapted to the style, and richly prominent; the Gothic style even crowning them with gables.

§ 47. The most essential building-plan in the last two styles, the form of the cathedral, has been developed from a transformation of the ancient basilica, which was an oblong of mason-work divided within by two rows of columns into three naves, — the middle and broader one probably uncovered, the anterior small side towards the entrance, and the posterior with semicircular structure covered over by a half-dome and designed for the judge's tribunal.

The Christian cultus demanded that the whole be roofed over, and on this account the middle nave had to be elevated beyond the side naves, in order to give it windows above; it therefore lost

the simple position of the columns, and erected high vertical walls above the architrave of the two rows of columns to support the roof and contain the windows. For the necessities of the cultus a stretch of the back part of the nave was then shut off toward the front; this 'sanctuary' thus obtained was then expanded into a cross-nave, and the tribunal likewise extended out into a lengthened prolongation of the longitudinal nave beyond the cross-nave. In this way did the form of a cross originate, which was subsequently almost always retained.

In this *Christian basilica* there was a living combination of the parts in the longitudinal direction of the nave only; since the space from column to column was spanned by arches, and the rectilinear entablature and the wall made to rest first on these arcades. Crosswise above these were two walls simply united by the one arch of the 'Porta triumphalis'; and this, in the place where the middle nave cuts into the cross-nave, with a mighty span passed from one row of columns to the other and secured a perspective to the semicircular niche in which the whole concluded opposite the portal. Paintings, mostly mosaics, filled the walls in a continuous series over the arcades, over the triumphal arch, and over the niche. The roof was

either flat or allowed the wood-work of the ridge-lead to be seen. Any peculiar external architecture was lacking.

The Romanesque and Gothic styles altered the above-mentioned plan, in part by their principle of the arch in general, and in part by the fact that they gave to all these parts a greater wealth of organism ; transformed the simple semicircular niche into a polygon with much more of life in it ; laid out the arms of the cross-nave either in lateral portals or, with a termination likewise of polygon-form, in chapels ; erected over the intersection of the naves (the quadrature) a dome for the most part eight-sided and ordinarily supported by a polygonal substructure [merely indicating also the semisphere and the circle in the upward direction, — compare § 44, — especially on the outside] ; occupied the anterior ends of the side-naves with two towers corresponding to each other ; and made use of the façade between them for an ornate portal.

Manifold deviations from this plan appear ; for example, *five* longitudinal naves, only *one* tower midway (an unfavorable position on many grounds). Many other parts besides were added, such as single small towers in the exterior angles of the intersecting naves, etc.

Most consistent of all appears the arrangement which commits to the towers alone the expression of a force completely free and aspiring upward without load of any kind; makes them on this account the highest points of all; does not interrupt their base by a portal but lets it remain massive; makes the middle dome not quite so high but broader, as the expression of a protecting covering over the most essential point of the structure; and repeats the same tendency to a protecting conclusion of the building with still inferior height at the end of the choir.

§ 48. Quite different principles appear to underlie the Moorish architecture. It is not alike in all lands, but has made use of the previously discovered element of domestic art for very different formations. What is peculiar to it and what everywhere appears, however, is the extraordinary taste for a peculiar wealth of decoration.

It shows itself first of all in this, that the walls are scarcely at all treated as such, but — probably as a reminiscence of tent-building in former times — almost wholly simply as curtains. As such they are covered all over with the most charming patterns; and, instead of being constructively articulated, they are in a suitable and spirited way so

disposed by means of projections, niches, and other interruptions, that the whole interior is effective more by its manifold perspective than by any reminder of architectonic construction. Even the extremely slender columns, on which arcades of pointed bows are erected aloft, remind us more of the supports of a tent-hanging than of the bearers of ponderous masses. The soaring, elastic bow of horse-shoe shape has, with all the grace which it frequently possesses, no properly *constructive* meaning, but rather recalls the mighty opening of a cleft.

The external architecture is insignificant where it did not take up with foreign forms. But the walls were masterly in this, that they imparted to large structures a diversity of picturesque, rural, and such-like beauty; just as by means of interior gardens, courts, and galleries, they drew nature and the surrounding prospect into the circle of their means of art.

§ 49. Private architecture cannot, like the monumental, employ the means, in all their seriousness and gravity, which appear in all these styles. It will find itself compelled for the most part to withdraw its regard from the peculiar constructive consistency, and to employ neither columns nor the Romano-gothic pillared vault. On the other hand, it will borrow

from the 'style' the general character of the division and grouping of the masses, as well as its customs of decoration. And this it is, of course, able to do; for its products make no pretence to be perfectly individual unities, symmetrically controlled by one law and withdrawn from everything fortuitous. The rather are they *then* most beautiful when they express, in correspondence with actual human life, varied and manifold necessities for the satisfaction of which human activity has gradually discovered convenient forms. This it has done in such manner that, whatever the individual component parts may chance to be, they are combined, without deeper meaning indeed and yet with a taste for agreeable forms on the exterior, so as to produce a comfortable arrangement of spaces in the interior and a picturesque relation of the whole to its surroundings.

Here, accordingly, new points of view come to prominence; — instead of symmetrical exclusiveness, the picturesque concurrence of particulars with one another; the contrast of single parts with each other and with their surroundings; finally and principally, that peculiar expression of the whole coloring of life and custom as we meet with it in the buildings of previous time which have gradually arisen in history.

CHAPTER V.

PLASTIC ART.

§ 50. If sculpture first originated from a naïve impulse at imitation, still there certainly also lay at its very foundation an interest in the unity which occurs in the living form between the spiritual interior and the bodily appearance; for it is to the imitation of what is alive that the aforesaid impulse is wont to be directed rather than to the imitation of what is merely lifeless form.

Accordingly, we give to the problem of sculpture this place, — namely, to represent how an individual spiritual life interpenetrates its corporal organization; and this in such a way (as we have already remarked) that the body does not simply obey a single impulse of the spirit in a merely passive way and as usable material, but appears in its whole structure as a perfect expression for the totality of this individual spiritual life.

§ 51. The entire *monumental* character which sculpture universally has on account of its enduring, ponderous, and rigid material (marble, bronze, etc.),

in itself forbids that it should choose as an object for its representations aught that possesses, through its inferior significance, no right to so lasting a representation. It will, accordingly, either exclude or reckon only among its subordinate works whatever is merely characteristical, what is of '*genre sort*'; on the contrary, it will always be compelled to seek its highest point of attainment in the delineation of ideal characters or rather of the sensuous appearance of such characters.

§ 52. But we further observe that the principal thing for sculpture must always be, not the action itself, but the figure which acts. For the value and meaning of the action either does not admit at all of being expressed by the sensuous representation of it, but must be added to it by thought, as it were; or else it gains nothing by such representation.

What can be attained in sculpture is the exhibition of the way in which either the spiritual life of the figure expresses itself in the action as an occasion; or else how this, or some occurrence or other, reacts upon the spirit of the figure and is received by it.

Now if the action is something very definite, and so compels the figure on its account to assume a very definite, specific position and motion; then such a work of sculpture, even though it should make very

obvious the ability of the figure for this one action or its excitability by this one occurrence, would still on this very account so much the more throw into the shade the thing at which it is aiming much more, — and this is, the constant and many-sided ability and dexterity with which the body would execute every other possible suggestion of the spirit and receive every other stimulus from without.

In general, therefore, the figure should not be a mere 'support for the action'; but only so much of action should be prominent as to give to the form an opportunity to display its many-sided aptitude for the expression of whatever is spiritual, as though by way of example.

§ 53. Just as little should the sculptured figure pass current as a symbol of a universal spiritual property, for example of some virtue. For every organic body corresponds, with the diversity of its members, only to an individual life that is active on very different sides, whose character is never expressible by a single property.

Accordingly, every allegory which makes use of the body thereto will have too little of spiritual content to be able to make every part of the form appear penetrated by it as a law-giving power; that is to say, the greater part of the figure will, strictly speaking, be of no purpose.

§ 54. But it is further necessary that such a spiritual life should not be chosen for representation as, by the requisition it makes upon itself, urges its form out of its natural proportions into a *pathological* characterization; although it may at the same time be able to give to itself in the body a very perfect and many-sided expression.

Such subjects may serve for poetry and painting, because these arts do not directly affront us by the image they present; or at least, in the surroundings or the narrative which they add to it, entice the attention away from the form to its more valuable content. To sculpture the characters are best fitted, whose doing of itself further displays the body in accordance with its own peculiar meaning, and idealizes it in the direction of its own peculiar proportions.

if this is to occur in the representation, then we must know that very direction in which the natural ideal of the human form lies, or the points on which its beauty depends. And here it at once appears that, apprehended as mere beauty of form, it would really be only a small thing; and that its infinite worth depends upon nothing but the fidelity with which its outlines, simple in aspect and dispensing with all the pomp of color, mirror the inner spiritual sensibility and its finest gradations.

§ 55. In general, a kind of dualism is expressed in the human form, between the head as the sole seat of consciousness and the entire remaining mass of the body. These forms, of opposition and yet at the same time of combination, as they are stamped upon the human neck, we find nowhere else in the whole animal series. All the forms in the animal kingdom, which allow both parts to melt into each other, as it were, have a dismal effect.

The head of man contains no organs that reach out actively, but only such as are passively receptive; and their ideal form is therefore, not one of projection but one of the utmost possible restraint within the general contour of the head. No system of covering which, though organically produced, is not otherwise alive, surrounds his body; but the skin everywhere appears penetrated through and through with the vital heat; the limbs not slim, as though barely calculated to meet the necessity of the case, and not like unorganic instruments appended to the body, but with a fulness of structure which is wholly foreign to the animal kingdom. Their number, however, is few, and expresses, as does the smallness of the head and the quiet retreating of the organs of sense, the secure domination of the spirit over what is external, better

than does the multitude and excessive flexibility of the instruments for motion and for seizing prey that belong to the so-called *lower* animals. The appearance of artificial machinery is avoided; only in the fingers does this mobility occur in miniature, which the purpose of man's life requires should not be wanting, but which is just as little made excessively prominent. Finally, we find everywhere soft and yielding forms of transition between the different parts which are to co-operate in motion; but acute-angled outlines where rigid parts meet each other, in order by their mere hardness to fulfil different functions.

The aforesaid indications — which might easily be multiplied — must be followed by the effort at idealization, and are followed in fact; so that beauty of form is so much the more highly prized, the more it seeks perfectly to carry out these specific tendencies of the organic form (elongation of the parts of the body; not excessive muscularity; diminution in the size of the head, etc.).

§ 56. It would be an incorrect mode of idealizing, to plan uniformly to represent only the life of youth or the body in the fulness of its bloom. To be sure, extreme old age and earliest childhood are physiologically imperfect periods of life. They, too, however,

are represented; not in order to bring this imperfection to view, but on the contrary to show how, even in forms such as *these*, the spiritual life not only in general finds means for its expression, but can even express itself more characteristically in them than in the full bloom of life. Thus it is much more natural for the form of gray old age than for such as is still in its bloom, strikingly to express the gains of all the past life in a variety of clever traits. And the opening development of the spiritual life in childhood or boyhood doubtless offers a multitude of naïve and graceful illustrations of the harmony of body and soul, which can no longer occur in such striking form when this harmony has already become rigidly fixed on all sides.

§ 57. The pose of the figure will always have for its principal purpose, to show not only the complete adaptability with which the body obeys the spiritual impulse, but also that with which every single part, by corresponding counterpoise, tension, or relaxation, compensates for the displacement of every other; so that the body appears as an extremely sensitive and elastic system of parts, which keeps itself in equilibrium, — the parts themselves possessing a reciprocal understanding for their various conditions. A very extraordinary action, for a wholly definite purpose,

would bring this excellence to view only in a one-sided manner, and just with reference to this purpose. A much less important movement — perhaps consisting simply in a slight and not uncomfortable deviation from the wholly inexpressive symmetrical pose — causes the occurrence of a much greater variety of such reciprocal compensations.

The pose of the figure must, besides, be picturesquely beautiful. Its contour ought not to fall under too rational and geometrical a 'scheme'; the limbs ought not to have parallel positions, or be withdrawn from the mass of the body unnecessarily far nor at extraordinary right angles, but with a gradual flow of lines. For all these movements with which fault has just been found are, in themselves, not natural to the human body; and where they are indispensable for particular purposes, it is better not to represent such purposes than herein to be true to nature.

Finally, the pose must be capable of being a permanent one; and all representations of those motions in which a body can be maintained only momentarily, are not proper subjects of sculpture, the wholly monumental work of which always carries an inclination toward the representation of what is eternal and ever significant.

§ 58. All the foregoing demands are fulfilled in the simplest manner by that handling of the vesture so often employed in ancient sculpture; and especially of one so formless as the Greek, which permits to every individuality a free treatment adapted to his temperament, and does not, like our own, make necessary any very definite methods of putting it on and taking it off. As a covering the vesture can be used only in the case of statues of historical persons, whose significance is for the most part expressed only in the head, so that the complete representation of the rest of the body would be useless and indecorous; and where, on the other hand, the vesture by the manner of its being thrown on in folds, strengthens the impression of the features by which the spiritual character can express itself even here in the body, — for example, by its carriage. Besides, the vesture is — strictly speaking — nothing but that bit of the external world which lies next the body, and on the preparation of which the peculiar temperament of the figure is just as truly stamped as on its dwelling, etc. Accordingly, it serves to make obvious to the senses the peculiar mobility of the figure and likewise give to it, by means of the arrangement of its hanging folds, a semblance of the feeling which the figure itself preserves through its surroundings and its carriage, and in which it delights.

§ 59. Most favorable for sculpture would the problem be, of simply portraying an unchanging individual temperament of mind, an enduring character; and always in such measured movements as have been spoken of. It is in this sense that the 'high style' of Greek sculpture has created a series of ideal images in which, without noise and motion outward, the depth of a significant character is most perfectly expressed.

Nevertheless, nothing hinders the movements of the mind, its affections, which originate out of its reciprocal action with the outward world, from being æsthetically realized. But sculpture, as monumental art, should not portray such affections as can only momentarily endure in a final and highest stage of movement; and since, on account of the lack of an explanatory environment, at least in single free statues, it cannot always make obvious the *motif* of the affections, it can only choose those which are of themselves intelligible to every one.

Accordingly, all passionate as well as all historical actions would be unfavorable to it:—the one because, resting on no reason themselves, they exceed the limits of beauty of form; the other, because their significance for the history of the world very rarely consists in a form of movement representable by plastic art, but rather in a condition of circumstances not co-representable.

Finally, every motion which would be significant of a lively relation of the statue to the actual world outside, must be avoided. Its true home, with which we can think of it as in 'mysterious' relation, is only the alike monumental world of architecture, and pre-eminently the landscape. On the contrary, to represent the statue as in mutual intercourse with men would be contrary to the universal charm of sculpture, contrary to this mysterious vivifying of the petrified, or these petrifications of life.

§ 60. The circle of ancient mythology, beyond which there is really nothing to be added, certainly best answers to all the foregoing demands, that of course do not with the same strictness hold good of the *bas-relief*; since this renders expressible, by its uniting background and the surroundings representable therein, much which is not otherwise to be expressed. But still the later Christian art has produced a great multitude of works, which may doubtless be far inferior to the ancient sculpture in beauty of form, in understanding of the structure of the human body, and in skilfulness of handling, as well as for the most part in beauty of material, and yet which have developed a wholly new style of representation.

To antiquity beauty of form and the perfect incar-

nation of the human spirit was the highest end of plastic art. It everywhere sought to portray life and that for which a bountiful nature has made the living human form. *Christian* art took its point of starting far more from the thought of the sacrifice of the corporeal to the spiritual world ; attained for the most part to the portrayal of death rather than of life ; and in all its successful works chiefly expresses the effort to bring into manifestation that which the living form itself has created from itself, — the indestructibility of its aspiration, the merit of its resignation. The domain of representation for such art was obviously much more limited than that of the ancient ; but it can scarcely be denied that the latter is lacking precisely in that which the former portrays ; and that there lies in this very fact something really great and valuable.

CHAPTER VI.

PAINTING.

§ 61. Painting makes its appearance even in *decoration* as an art of free beauty, the fancy occupying itself only with a play of forms and colors. Here it, in part, makes prominent the limits of the larger surfaces by lines that correspond to the forces working in them ; and then makes the points of the corners, as the places where general directions intersect, the special seat of a more significant ornamentation : in part also, it decorates the surfaces themselves, and here has its most happy experience in case it either fills out their entire extent with an uninterrupted repetition of a regular elementary form in rigid or waving lines ; or else, in case it lets the greater part of these surfaces remain as a background entirely free, and only covers single prominent points with the more important embellishments thickly set. On the contrary, the scattered patterns generally have an unpleasant effect ; and where in nature something similar to them appears beautiful, there are always special accessory relations which make the impression supportable. Our feeling

demands in decoration that every part, however small and in itself of no sufficient importance, should have reference to every other; and, on this account, it at least enjoins certain unobtrusive combinations between the scattered parts. As concerning the coloring given to the decoration, the much disputed theory of the harmony of colors must be left to future consideration.

§ 62. In landscape-painting the somewhat overwrought tendency to represent not the beauty of the forms of the region, but the mysterious unconscious rule of the spirit of nature, has led to a preference for wild, unexpected, and rugged shapes, in which immense natural forces, that appear not adjusted to each other, contend together rather than come to a peaceful and clear issue.

With all the good which this romantic inclination has awakened, we must still regard that point of view as the more correct, which looks upon the landscape as a dwelling-place for spiritual life. The form of the ground makes possible an inexhaustible manifoldness of the most varied well-being, of self-deportment and self-movement for every living thing; and these are not merely advantages for the comfort of man; but even to that which has no life, to vegetation, the arrangement of the landscape guarantees

the possibility of a varied propagation, a half-conscious feeling of which we transfer to the objects themselves ;— a feeling similar to the common feeling which we ourselves maintain through these diverse kinds of more or less habitable, homelike, spacious or limited environment.

Now although we ascribe to the parts of the landscape itself an enjoyment of the position which they occupy in it, yet in truth our interest therein always lies in those feelings which *we* have ; or the origin of which we anticipate in case we transfer ourselves in the picture from one point to another. For we thus enjoy from each one of these points of view the peculiar stimulus of the now shifted surroundings, and rejoice in the fresh furtherance of our existence, in our motion and the repose which we share by means of them.

§ 63. The composition of the piece must have regard to representing the landscape, which has a meaning only as a part of the actual world, always as being such part. The surrounding frame signifies that the landscape is cut off at this place, without ceasing to exist ; on the contrary, it stands connected with the rest of the world. Some highway or other, some perspective, or at least some stream of water, some trail of clouds, etc., must occur in it, in order to

strengthen this indication of a connection with the rest of the world. Finally, the action of the light, together with the play of the colors, has this general significance of being the most comprehensive bond that extends from every point to every other in manifold refractions and reflections, and so with love unites everything into one common nature.

Belief in the reality of the landscape is further strengthened by a certain *irrationality* in its arrangement. It is true that the eye demands a coordination of parts which admits of a general survey: nevertheless it is not similar but different shapes that should appear at the symmetrical points of space; so that an equilibrium in the distribution of the masses is presented to the look that contemplates them, and yet not such precise symmetry as is foreign to nature. The principal points in the content of the picture should not fall upon the principal points of space, but eccentrically and at one side of them. They should not stand exactly at the end of rectilinear perspective, but should occur at incalculable places. In general, all rectilinear extension should be considered inferior to spiral vistas. The outlines of the whole should likewise shun such symmetry; and, especially, it ought not to be required of the eye to make an abrupt decline in one direction, without offering it some place of halting

for its repose. No multiplication of similar objects ought to weary the gaze by its parallel arrangement.

§ 64. If we look about us in life, we discover that, in buildings, in implements, in costume, in the human form itself, it is by no means what is strictly unimpaired, perfect, normal, that gives the impression of the picturesque; the rather does this impression as a rule attach itself to that in these forms which—in part by their destruction (ruins, tatters, etc.) and, in part, by a sharper one-sided imprint—awakens the recollection of a history in which the spiritual life was in conflict with an outside-world, has assumed many remaining traces of it, but has sought to place itself in some kind of equilibrium with it.

Especially in *genre-painting* must this be the prevalent and essential purpose of the representation,—namely, to make it apparent how the external circumstances, the calling in life, riches or poverty of surroundings, etc., invariably imprint ineradicable traces on the human form; but how, nevertheless, the energy of the spiritual nature is so indestructible that it is able to win some kind of satisfaction from every situation however unfavorable, or at least to preserve its own greatness under its burdens.

It is only this feature of the recognition of man's worth which imparts to *genre-painting* a higher

significance. The mere faithful imitation of nature would indeed awaken in us the conception, that even the possibility of representing something vulgar or wretched in so striking a manner presupposes at the same time an elevation above it, and also elevates the beholder above it. Still paintings of this sort will stir us only for once by their technique, and subsequently leave us coolly disposed.

The domain of genre-painting is without limit; and, besides the characteristic which shows us the skilfulness and adaptability of the human spirit with reference to altogether special relations of life, we can distinguish one yet more universal, which exhibits the typical ages of life and their normal occurrences; and finally, a higher ideal one, which does not so much exhibit ideally the individual figures, but rather causes us to see, in the manner of their deportment, a universal style of life and existence, such as the spirit of a time or of a people has set as its law for itself.

§ 65. Beyond this last achievement of genre-painting, in giving the exhibition of a special phase of human culture, even historical painting, for which there is just now somewhat designedly a demand, does not get. The depiction of great men, and of the more significant historical epochs, is certainly a

proper aim of poetry, but not of painting. Pictures will only contribute as *illustrations* to the otherwise well-known significance of history; but they never immediately represent it. Historical persons and events, in spite of all the significance attached to their meaning, are often very insignificant in the external form of their appearance. We endure this in life and in poetry; because we construct a pretty correct total picture for ourselves out of an innumerable throng of successive views. Painting, on the contrary, could not depict such events without being unintelligible and tedious.

The highest demand upon an historical picture which can be set up is, that it shall always choose a situation or transaction which, even in case its historical meaning is not understood, will invariably still remain a beautiful genre picture; and will always afford a significant meaning of more general kind, a certain peculiar culture, an imprint of human life that is harmonious with itself, although not to be transposed into any definite time and place.

§ 66. Historiographic painting, which (in opposition to the strictly historical) treats the sacred "stories" as belonging to all time, contains within its province of subjects all that would be representable in the strictly historical as well. Above all things

this whole domain is genuinely picturesque, in so far as the entire Old and New Testaments are little more than a constant teaching how the inner man is to adjust himself to the accidents of external life, discipline himself in them, and turn them to account for what is eternal.

It was precisely in the recollection of this struggle that what is peculiar to painting lay ; and we do not find it in the ancient mythological figures that, with all the great beauty of form with which antiquity portrayed them, still exhibited an intensive and peculiar energy of life rather than an actual spiritual character. On the contrary, the Bible and the legends offer innumerable characters of the most individual kind ; and indeed of such kind, that their spiritual stamp is so generally known as to make them supply completely for us the place of mythology, though with the further advantage that the world in which they lived is felt by us to be united with our own in what is most essential. All the situations in which any moral law whatever is applicable, in which any longing or any passion whatever can develope, find in that world an appropriate example.

Add to this the simple and easily intelligible forms of the eastern civilization, so picturesquely beautiful, in drapery, architecture, and manners ; and besides,

finally, the possibility of putting every time and every place in an easily recognizable relation to this world of the past and to its spiritual perpetuation in our own : so that, to conclude, scarcely anything human of general interest can be thought of, which would not be capable of perfect representation by means of the figures of the sacred history as well-known types of an ideal world realized.

§ 67. The further artistic treatment of these subjects admits of less general rules, and must be left for the special criticism of art-works.

In general, painting will be compelled to make use of the means belonging to it. Accordingly since, by the drawing and coloring of the back-ground and of the surroundings, it is enabled to produce certain momentary moods of some figure in its dependence upon external incitements, it will not succeed best if it exhibits only the stationary character of the shape instead of its mood and action, and so falls back into the task that belongs to sculpture. It is further bound to give shape to these actions at best as richly as possible, without allowing them to become unintelligible. For the more painting is really capable of imitating actual life in its fullness, the more do we require that it should represent not merely the scanty meaning of a single action, but also the

echoes it awakens in the world, the way in which it is experienced by others, variously judged, and everywhere received with manifold sympathy.

Painting, therefore, first began to satisfy its problem, when it abandoned those isolated images on a golden background, and grouped all the manifold things of the real world as a participating environment around the sacred histories. It is not all transactions which will bear such numerous surroundings ; but in each case we are likely in the end to wish that its connection with the real world were indicated in some more modest way, and that the persons who act were not thrust forth, as it were, into an empty space.

It would not be right, on this account, to demand that no figure be seen in a painting which is not *necessary* to the meaning of the action. On the contrary, just as we give to the (necessary) figures themselves, characteristic features that are not necessary for the action ; so are even these apparently superfluous surroundings indispensable in order to draw the action into the world, in which every event has beside itself others that are primarily indifferent to it but perhaps later coöperate with it.

The demands for 'a unity of the picture' can, therefore, hold good only in so far as that the principal interest must not fall in equal parts upon

different disconnected transactions. It would not be simplicity but poverty, however, if, besides the principal transaction, there nowhere offered itself any view which supported with diminished strength the excited frame of mind, or rested it in measured fashion.

Finally, the formal laws of grouping the objects (pyramidal grouping, etc.) will have to be absolutely subordinate to the meaning of the action, and they will have to follow the same points of view as in landscape-painting.

CHAPTER VII.

POETIC ART.

§ 68. Poetry rules alike in all the domains which stand open to the foregoing arts. To it alone, however, belongs the perfect rule over the world of events, some of whose external forms painting also can express; while only poetry is able exhaustively to express the inner connection.

In this, therefore, do we see its essential problem. All else, — the free beauty of melodious speech, the depicting of shapes for intuition, — is only an accessory problem or means for the effect. The kernel of all poetry lies in the representation of motion, which ceaselessly combines with one another the parts of the world according to general laws, and according to a sacred plan.

The question may be raised, whether in this matter poetry is merely to imitate nature with fidelity or to idealize. The latter, however, is its necessity; because it can never undertake to exhibit the *whole* of the world, but only the meaning and spirit of the whole, in one small fragment of the same. In the limited field of view which it

thus puts in relief, many threads of events, however, are crossed, for the individual observer, of which only a few come to any conclusion, while most run into the rest without beginning and end, and without manifest relation; so that the chain of processes, in whose coherency and consistent development one of the highest laws of the world-plan is in fact expressed, is kept apart by a great throng of uninfluential secondary processes. Idealizing here consists in separating out what is indifferent, imperfect, and devoid of relation, and in the concentration of the actual course of the world upon single great-circles of events, in which an inner connection is manifest even for the observer's small field of view.


§ 69. All universal sciences, — ethics, philosophy of nature, history, — if they pursue their subject-matter into the minute details in which its full significance for the first time becomes apparent, issue at last in poetry; — that is to say, they can only exhibit what is of most worth, when they cease to proceed in accordance with universal categories, and furnish a portrayal of the innumerable tender and individual relations, on which the significance of what is particular depends.

In this sense alone does poetry have teaching for

its aim, — that is to say, the teaching of that which is inexpressible in any other manner. But every other didactic aim, for the fulfilment of which science suffices, always carries poetry beyond its proper limits. It has nothing else to do but to furnish *motifs* for reflection and feeling by a portrayal of the actual world, such that every one may draw his own teaching for himself from them. But at the same time it must have regard to this, that it depict in fact the *actual* world, whose sacredness is so great that every invention which capricious thinking has composed, of such sort that it would have no rational place in the actual world and no coherency with it, can hold good only as an unpoetic exercise of ingenious virtuosity.

§ 70. The first species of poetry, the *narrative*, preserves in the simplest way that disposition which, without any special tendency in the portrayal of the world's manifoldness, seeks only for an elevating and refreshing expansion of the mind; such as, for example, comes over us on a journey when we rejoice in the variety and inexhaustibleness of existence, and from this consideration draw a thousand unutterable lessons without especially hunting after a single one of them.

This frame of mind, the joy in objectivity, is most



brilliantly manifested in the Greek epic poetry, favored by a peculiarity of civilization which has never since recurred. The Greek mode of apprehending the world indicated the earth as the sole centre and abode of life in the world. For its service and adornment even the world of the gods exists. And neither in the remoteness of space did there lie for this time any longings after the immeasurable, nor did life extend itself in time between a creation and a judgment of the world. Without advance, without history, without grudging and longing after some goal or other, always simply enjoying itself and satisfied with itself, flowed on the life *ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε*; and all reflections concerning a transcendent vocation of the whole of existence, which are so frequent with us, were wholly lacking to the general consciousness of that time.

To this disposition the favorable condition of culture contributed; and so did receptivity for fine forms of life, which, as well in public as in private, were still simple enough to leave to the actions of every day a certain religious value and a sanctity of ceremonial. On this account the most ordinary behavior of life might become the subject of a poetic treatment.

All these circumstances laid the foundations of that character of cheerful resignation and contentment with human lot, which is peculiar to the Greek epic.

§ 71. From all the foregoing points of view, and from the essential reason, that ingenuous joy in human nature is peculiar to epic poetry, we conclude first: the tale requires only an external unity, — namely, an uninterrupted continuity of the representation as to how things have come from one another, — but not such an inner dramatic unity as to secure that one circle of events, in which a destiny is developed from its first beginning to its catastrophe, should be carried onward.

On the contrary, it is unfavorable to epic poetry to choose as its subject one *great* catastrophe; because in part the strain of attention to its issue, and in part the relaxation after its fulfilment, disturbs the quiet frame of mind. The epic has rather to draw from the fullness of human life one such fragment as is not essentially different from other fragments that are suppressed. As the epic depicts life, so must it always have been; and we must have the impression, that so it is going on even to infinity.

Precisely on this account, however, the tale should be no altogether limited *idyl*. It should rather always be some heroic history, by means of which humanity and even the world of the gods is set astir far and wide, and thereby opportunity for expression given to the diversity of human existence — a significant centre to what is in itself insignificant and small and yet indispensable.

For similar reasons the characters are all simple, obvious, and perspicuous, without psychological profundity, not formed by the destinies of life nor by reflection or premeditated culture, but wholly natural growths; so that they are simply brought by all the fates they suffer, to the expression of their permanent character and not to a changeable course of education.

The characters are, further, to be maintained in such manner that they permit themselves to be impelled by the condition of circumstances simply to those expressions which are founded within the limits of natural human development. All depth and passionateness of the feelings, all thoughtful reflection over the existing situation, is freely permitted to the epic, and by no means subordinated to mere external action. Only consideration must be given to this rule, that the characters do not let themselves be drawn aside by external inducements to reflections for which no sufficient reason exists in the characters themselves.

In externals, the representation has above all to preserve the uniformity of a quiet frame of mind, by shunning surprising effects, by complete statement of the *motif* for everything, by equally great circumstantiality, by homogeneousness of meter, by shunning all lyric outbursts. It must of itself quench all

excitement of the mental mood, by much art in delaying, by the interpolation of comparisons, by the quiet way with which it abandons itself for a time to manifold episodes before proceeding to a main development of the history. In this way it must also strengthen the impression that every particular, in spite of the natural sympathy which it awakens, is after all nothing in comparison with the immeasurable life that, in the epic, as though one looked down from a great height, is surveyed in wide stretches at one time.

§ 72. The poetry of the West in its greater narrative poems has not attained the preëminence of the ancient epic, but only in the briefer form of the *romance* has fashioned another species of narrative, in which the attention belonging to the emphatic event is no longer directed to ingenuous enjoyment of the *whole* of human life, but to the exhibition of one particular by means of its own gravity and significance. It is only rarely, therefore, that the miniature painting of the epic, with its *motif* for everything, occurs in such poetry. The rather does the representation hasten from one principal point of the history to another—omitting even to supply the fancy with the essential intermediate members; and so compresses a catastrophe together with its preparatory events into one small sharply-defined picture.

From the collection of such single songs, in which a coherent larger history of the same species is developed, there arises a certain equivalent for the epic, but still of quite another spirit. For although in this way a general picture of civilized human life is to a certain degree attained in the representation, yet after all, this never happens with such uniform circumstantiality as in the epic ; on the contrary, the interest in the peculiar significance of the tale far outweighs that in the permanent form of the world in which it proceeds.

§ 73. While the epic depicts ready-made characters, as it were, the peculiar problem of romance is the gradual education of plastic minds by means of the intersecting influences of a manifoldly complicated condition of life.

Accordingly, *modern* histories necessarily come within the sphere of the novel ; and so do all such characters as do not deport themselves unnaturally and stiffly, whether with respect to what is good or bad, or with respect merely to the properties belonging to them. Only the *comic* novel would make use of these characters, in order to show how every individuality which considers itself as finished, comes short of it ; while the problem of man is to have imagination enough to recognize the worth of ex-

ternal influences, and to accommodate himself to them in his mental culture.

On the other hand, the novel constantly needs a clear historical background, in order that the developments which are to fashion character may appear as events in an actual course of the world. Yet great historical figures and events themselves will never furnish for it a happy principal subject. They appear better in the background, and leave the foreground free to more simple human characters, in whom the efficacy and significance of the historical ones is gathered together, as it were, and comes to view in its after-effects far better than in direct form.

Instead of psychological truthfulness we rather demand perspicuity in the characters. For the former is less a subject for judgment ; and a character whose fidelity to fact admits of demonstration, but which, nevertheless, as an individual caprice, departs widely from the development of what is common to humanity, would not be the right subject either for this or for any other kind of poetry.

The external form of the novel requires prose as the only one sufficiently modifiable for the representation of situations differing greatly in value.

§ 74. If the epic is a wide and grand outlook upon human life from a lofty point of view, the *lyric* poem

is the expression of a movement of the fancy by means of which the spirit, chained at first to a single limited stand-point amidst the world's throng, overlooking only a few fragments of reality, and uncertain concerning the situation of its own present position toward the world at large, still endeavors to lift itself upward to such an emancipating, cheering, and redeeming point of view.

It is, therefore, always an *occasional* poem, and is an effort to express the emotion from which it proceeds, not merely through nature's voice in just the manner in which it is felt; but so to interpret this mere material of passion that its connection with the meaning of the world, its relation to reality, and the justification of its existence, are apparent. If therefore the mood of mind itself is to be compared to some impalpable fragrance, the poetry must likewise invent the form for the blossom which yields the fragrance.

This way of objectifying what belongs to the subjective experience of passion is, at least, the height of lyric achievement, beside which all else appears only as an inferior exercise of the art.

§ 75. Several species may be distinguished; first, the song which proceeds only from a universal mood, and seeks to find for this merely external expression,

— those songs, for example, which are designed for sociability among several individuals. Next to this stands, in the second place, the song which, starting from some single circumstance, then depicts a situation that belongs either to human life or to nature, and afterwards pursues this single fact into its more general significance, whether it be for the purpose of comprehending the result in one sentence, or of making it appear intelligible to the mind by some simile or in some other perspicuous form.

The principal problem—as we already alluded to the fact—will always consist in at least opening a perspective from the mind's immediate mood out into a general view of the world. In what form this happens is generally a matter indifferent and indeterminate; but surely it is an error to look for any essential advantage in that sort of elegance and formal correctness, as it was elaborated especially by the Romans in opposition to the far more poetic self-abandonment of the Greeks.

On the contrary, it is this perfecting of form for all representations in life, which, in order to transcend what is common-place, seeks in poetic modes of expression what is especially suitable. And, doubtless, we must always regard this kind of occasional poetry as one form of practising the art, although a subordinate one; just as is the *reflective* poetry, at present

not less often strongly blamed, whose subjects are really very frequently not to be treated otherwise than in poetic form.

§ 76. The interest in dramatic representation certainly consists quite naturally in the enjoyment of the living reality, with which it contributes an innumerable quantity of delicate and significant features, that necessarily escape narration, for the exposition of what is said; and, further, in the circumstantiality with which it comprehends contemporaneous reciprocal actions, that are too widely separated for the narration.

It is just as obvious that the slow shaping of character (the problem of the novel), and further the relations of man to nature and the depicting of mere situation, are not adapted to this form of poetry; and that it—quite true to nature—seeks its object in the actions which one individual performs towards others. •

It is in this, however, that all conditions of the drama generally consist; and every subject-matter which can be skillfully treated in this form has also a right to it. On the other hand, the more sharply defined demands—such as unity of plan, implication, development, catastrophy, etc.—which it is now frequently supposed must be made from reasons of

dialectical æsthetics, do not hold good for the drama in general, but only for the highest form of it.

§ 77. From the foregoing point of view the drama, strictly speaking, has nothing further to do but to care for the possibility of giving its subject-matter a scenic representation. A unity of action is not the most general requirement; even by a diversity of action some one general direction, the picture of a time or situation, might very well be dramatically represented in an effective way.

Doubtless, however, the special forms of tragedy and comedy take shape from this general problem; but in these forms it is no longer any so general picture, but some more special ethical or metaphysical idea which is to be represented. This necessitates the suppressing of what is diverse, in order not to 'distract the attention, and the grouping of all around one principal circle of action, in whose uninterrupted causal nexus, that idea is plainly involved.

Such diversity is, nevertheless, not to be dispensed with. For a satisfactory vividness, fidelity to nature, and depth of æsthetic impression, it is essential that any destiny fraught with meaning should not unfold itself in isolation, as though in an empty space. Some environment must be in existence, which forms for it a kind of resonance as it were; and which

shows from what *motifs* of the spirit of the age, of the general situation, culture, etc., the event itself proceeds ; and, further, how it reacts upon the diverse forms of human character, and receives from them a variety of critical estimates, by means of which its own entire significance is first made obvious. Finally, we need a number of figures, in order to have the encouraging certainty that, besides the one-sidedness of the principal characters represented, human nature possesses a yet inexhaustible capacity for forming others.

In all the foregoing relations the ancient drama stands decidedly behind the modern ; and as much so in respect to the unity of space and time, which is a partly unnatural, partly unimportant, and partly harmful, condition of dramatic representation.

§ 78. Tragedy and comedy have, fundamentally considered, the same end ; — namely, to show that it is the general metaphysical weakness of every finite nature to come to harm, as soon as it deems itself capable of playing the part of Providence, and of laying hold on the coherent system of the world's course, as a formative and guiding principle. Only that in tragedy, great and powerful characters, with plans of much moment, are shattered, being overthrown by the vast forces of the world's course ;

while, in comedy, insignificant figures with their petty intrigues are overthrown by the ordinary accidents of life.

A specially *moral* point of view, unless one chooses to assume it for the purpose, does not underlie tragedy. It has neither to reward ideal nor to punish morally bad characters; but is primarily interested even in the bad only through the force with which it is active, and through its being shattered on the yet greater force of the world's ongoing movement.

Although, therefore, the drama should not contradict our moral judgment, yet it is to administer a somewhat different, and, in part, a finer justice. Characters which, judged in respect to their life, appear morally praiseworthy, and only perish through mistake, are here made answerable for the mistake (*πρώτον ψεῦδος*). For, in fact, their fault lies in this that they, forgetting their finiteness, endeavor with all their force to realize their convictions.

§ 79. It is on this account always required of the principal character in tragedy, that it perish through some fault of its own; while it is not necessary that we should be able to give a similar account also of the fate of each subordinate figure. Poetry should, even in the drama, represent the destruction of fair

spirits in the same elegiac fashion as that which our lamenting follows also in real life.

The aforesaid 'fault' of the principal character does not, however, need for the same reason to be *moral* in the narrower sense. The rather was antiquity right in imputing to the finite subject the simple fatal error just as completely as the crime against conscience. Still something is naturally gained in tragic effect, if an action that is *free*, and further such an one as does not appear absolutely objectionable but as a duty in collision with other duties, — if finally, a mighty force directed toward a noble end, is shattered against what is less righteous and yet paramount. On this account all reformatory spirits are favorite subjects of tragedy; for in all of them that *ὑβρις* is prominent, which even antiquity quite correctly designated as the tragic fault that comprises all other faults.

§ 80. A more extended analysis would show us the presence of the *comic* wherever an intention, that appears to itself of a lofty character and is fulfilled with the false consciousness of its value, is suddenly and obviously thwarted and brought to nothing in a way to do the subject no harm, through the petty and insignificant circumstances of life, which the observer easily foresees, and the foreseeing of which

he would on this account have required of the wisdom that estimates itself so highly.

Accordingly, even great characters appear laughable at the particular moments when their limitations plainly come to view. But most examples of the comic are furnished by all those cases of interrupted decorum, in which an activity that has clothed itself in the forms of what is elevated, solemn, premeditated, and calculated, is suddenly brought to nothing by such petty circumstances. In this aspect, therefore, the comic invariably stands in special opposition to what is elevated ; but above all to what is pathetic.

Matters are not so arranged in comedy that single sudden effects form its principal affair. Here, what is to be reached is not the sudden dissolving into nothing of an intense expectation, but the defeating, constantly and everywhere, by external circumstances, of the petty intriguing activity of a single character (*passive* figures are never the principal *dramatis personæ* in a comic way). Here a major part of the impression lies in the clearness with which we are able uninterruptedly to follow the conflict between the intention (of the character) and the condition of circumstances.

As for the rest, comedy does not require characters so strongly individualized as does tragedy, but can attain its impression — whose movement is in general

not so grave — far better than the latter in figures of a common type. On the other hand, if it is to have a refreshing effect, it must make good the insignificance of its subjects by forms of special elegance and fineness of execution.

INDEX.

INDEX.

A.

Agreeable, the, nature of, 1 f.

Architecture, domain of, 47; laws of, 47 f.; the Greek, 48; the Roman, 55 f.; the Gothic, 58 f.; the Moorish, 65 f.; private, 66.

Art, beginnings of, 27; laws of, 28 f.; the plastic, 68.

B.

Basilica, the ancient, 62; the Christian, 63 f.

Beautiful, the, nature of, 1 f.; distinguished from the useful, 5; as related to pleasure, 12, 15; distinguished from the true and good, 13; actualization of, 22, 24.

Beauty, standard of, 2; as a moral idea, 5 f.; not mere means, 6 f.; as a universal, 7 f.; as objective, 8, 9; as idea, 9 f., 12; defined, 11; of the Soul, 14, 18; of Things, 18 f.; as involving Space, Time, and Motion, 22; of symmetry, 23, 83; of grace, 25 f.; of sublimity, 26; conditions of, 28 f., 30.

Bible, influence of, on painting, 87.

Byzantine Style, the, 56.

C.

Church, the Christian, derivation of, 62; development of, from basilica, 62 f.

Columns, the, in Greek architecture, 48 f., 52 f.; in Gothic, 38 f.

Comedy, meaning of, 104 f.; character in, 106 f.

D.

Drama, the problem of, 102 f.; unity of action in, 103 f.; tragic and dramatic, 104 f.

E.

Epic, the Greek, 02 f.; sources of the, 05; simplicity of, 05 f.

F.

Fancy, as distinguished from imagination, 20; as creative, 20 f.

Feeling, as expressed in music, 43.

Figure, the human, in sculpture, 71 f.; pose of, 74.

G.

Genre-Painting, sources of, 84.

Gothic Style, æsthetic character of, 58; columns of, 85 f.; vault and roof of, 59; ornamentation in, 60, 61 f.; the cathedral in, 62 f.

Grace, a form of beauty, 25.

Greek Architecture, 48 f., 50 f., 52 f.

Greek Sculpture, 76 f., 78.

H.

Happiness, necessary to beauty, 15 f.

History, not representable in painting, 85 f.

I.

Idyl, the, 95 f.

L.

Landscape-Painting, 81 f.; arrangement in, 83.

Law, as related to beauty, 10, 29 f.

Lyric, the, 99 f.

M.

Melody, æsthetic character of, 38 f.; relation to fundamental tone, 39, 40 f.

Moorish Architecture, derivation of, 65 f.

Motion, an element of beauty, 13 f., 22, 88.

Music, nature of, 33; æsthetic laws of, 35 f., 39; time in, 37; key of, 41 f.; problems of, 42; power to express feeling, 43, 44 f.; spiritual value of, 45 f.;

Mythology, as furnishing themes for sculpture, 78; and for painting, 87.

N.

Nature, imitation of, in art, 84 f.

O.

Ornamentation in architecture, 51, 60 f.

P.

- Painting**, æsthetic character of, 80 f., 87 f.; landscape, 81 f., 83; *genre*, 84; historical, 85 f.; limitations of, 89 f.
Plan, as related to beauty, 10; in architecture, 48.
Poetry, problem of, 91 f.; as didactic, 93; species of, 93 f.; the Greek, 94 f.; of the West, 97.

R.

- Reality**, three realms of, 10.
Roman Architecture, 55 f.
Romance, the, 97 f.; problem of, 98 f.
Romanesque Style, the, 57 f., 60 f.
Roof, in architecture, 54.

S.

- Sculpture**, problem of, 68 f.; material of, 68 f.; the figure in, 70, 72 f.; laws of, 70 f., 72 f., 74 f.; the Greek, 76 f.; Christian, 78 f.
Senses, as conditioning beauty, 28 f.
Songs, varieties of, 100 f.
Soul, the, as beautiful, 14, 18; as furnishing conditions of beauty, 30.
Space, as a factor in the beautiful.
Style, in architecture, 48.
Sublimity, a form of beauty, 26.
Symmetry, an element of beauty, 23; landscape should lack, 83.

T.

- Time**, as a form of reality, 22.
Tones, æsthetic quality of, 33 f.; series of, 35.
Tragedy, meaning of, 104; character in, 105 f.

U.

- Unity**, of a painting, 89 f.; of the drama, 103.

Philosophy.

Empirical Psychology ; or, The Human Mind as

Given in Consciousness. By LAURENS P. HICKOK, D.D., LL.D.
Revised with the coöperation of JULIUS H. SEELYE, D.D., LL.D.,
President of Amherst College. 12mo. 300 pages. Mailing Price,
\$1.25 ; Introduction, \$1.12 ; Allowance, 40 cts.

Hickok's "Science of the Mind," which has been in the hands of teachers and students for more than a quarter of a century, has been here wholly revised, and almost wholly re-written, making it not only a new text-book but a new contribution to the important science of which it treats. The precision of statement and thoroughness of treatment which so remarkably characterized the original work, and made it so highly prized by so many teachers, are no less conspicuous in the present work ; but a different method in the general discussion has been adopted, though the end originally sought is the same.

The publishers believe that the book will be found to be remarkably comprehensive, and at the same time compact and clear. It gives a complete outline of the Science, concisely presented, and in precise and plain terms.

John Bascom, Pres. of Univ. of Wisconsin, Madison : It is an excellent book. It has done much good service, and, as revised by President Seelye, is prepared to do much more. (*Feb. 3, '82.*)

delineation of the mental faculties so clear and accurate that the careful student will hardly fail to recognize its truth in his own experience. (*April 6, 1882.*)

I. W. Andrews, Pres. Marietta Coll., Ohio : I am glad to see that this work holds its place among our text-books on that most important subject. Dr. Hickok I regard as one of the ablest of our philosophical writers, and few teachers have had so large and successful an experience as President Seelye. This new edition, carefully revised by these two gentlemen, may be confidently recommended as presenting a

M. Valentine, Pres. and Prof. of Intellectual and Moral Science, Pennsylvania Coll., Gettysburg : I take pleasure in saying that the new edition impresses me very favorably. This work of Dr. Hickok is unquestionably one of high ability and much merit, and, by its close analysis and compact, orderly classification of the mind's powers, admirably suited for use as a text-book. Its value is increased in this edition. (*Jan. 28, '82.*)

Hickok's Moral Science.

By LAURENS P. HICKOK, D.D., LL.D. Revised with the coöperation of JULIUS H. SEELYE, D.D., LL.D., President of Amherst College. 12mo. Cloth. 288 pages. Mailing price, \$1.25; Introduction, \$1.12; Allowance, 40 cents.

This work is an entire and careful revision of Hickok's original text-book of Moral Science. The remarkable excellences of that book, unsurpassed as it is in systematic rigor and scientific precision, are carefully retained in the present edition. Many parts of the book have, however, been rewritten entirely, modifying the original statements where this was necessary for clearness, and adding new discussions where this was required for fulness. To the many teachers who have used the original text-book with such signal profit, the publishers confidently commend this new and revised edition; and with equal confidence they offer it to others who would like a manual in which the principles of morality are expounded in a manner as truly simple as it is thoroughly scientific.

A. P. Peabody, *Prof. of Christian Morals, Harvard Coll.*: Permit me to express my very high appreciation of the value of the work. I read it when it first appeared with the greatest interest and satisfaction, and in its present form it possesses whatever added claims the most skilful and careful editorship can give. Had it appeared a month earlier, should more probably than not have adopted it.

G. P. Fisher, *Prof. of Church History, Yale Coll.*: I have long wanted to see just such a book,—one in which practical ethics should be clearly and systematically and philosophically presented. I am very much pleased with the chapters relating to duties, and not less so with the more theoretical portion of the work. The style is so perspicuous, and at the same time so concise, that the work is eminently adapted to serve as a text-book in colleges and higher schools. In matter and manner it is a capital book, and I wish it God speed.

C. B. Hulbert, *Pres. Middlebury Coll., Vt., and Prof. of Moral Science*: In its present form it is the best of recently issued text-books on Moral Science.

A. A. E. Taylor, *Pres. of Univ. of Wooster, Ohio, and Prof. of Biblical Instruction*: It is a capital text-book for the class-room, fully abreast of the ethical controversies of the day.

I. W. Andrews, *Pres. Marietta Coll., O., and Prof. of Intellectual Philosophy*: It is sound, strong, and clear. I doubt whether any work on Moral Science surpasses this in the depth and permanence of the impression made upon the student. It requires study, of course, but it will repay the student, whether teacher or pupil. The part on duties to the State is admirable for its fulness and precision.

Wm. F. Swahlen, *Pres. McKendree Coll., Lebanon, Ill.*: I am more and more pleased with it.

The N. E. Journal of Education: Taken altogether, it is an admirable text-book, and we cordially recommend it for use wherever pupils are old enough to consider morality in a scientific way, or to discuss intelligently the fundamental principles of civil government. No subjects are more vitally necessary in public education, and this volume presents them in a clear, compact, and forcible manner.

Rational Psychology; or, The Subjective Idea

and Objective Law of all Intelligence. By LAURENS P. HICKOK, D.D., LL.D. 543 pages. 8vo. Mailing Price, \$1.95. Introduction, \$1.80.

Creator and Creation; or, The Knowledge in the

Reason of God and His Work. By LAURENS P. HICKOK, D.D., LL.D. 360 pages. 8vo. Mailing Price, \$1.75. Introduction, \$1.60.

The Logic of Reason, Universal and Eternal.

By LAURENS P. HICKOK, D.D., LL.D. 192 pages. 8vo. Mailing Price, \$1.60. Introduction, \$1.44.

Humanity Immortal; or, Man Tried, Fallen, and

Redeemed. By LAURENS P. HICKOK, D.D., LL.D. 362 pages. 8vo. Mailing Price, \$1.75. Introduction, \$1.60.

These books discuss the most difficult and important problems of human thought. Though each is complete in itself, they pursue the following order:—

The EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY gives the basis of all physical and logical science.

The RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY connects all science with philosophy.

The CREATOR AND CREATION gives the philosophy of all mechanical and vital forces.

The MORAL SCIENCE is already in the field of philosophy, and gives the basis of *Æsthetics*, *Politics*, *Ethics*, and *Theology*.

The LOGIC OF REASON frees empiricism from all scepticism in the attainment of a Being absolutely Universal and Eternal.

The HUMANITY IMMORTAL gives the Divine history of human experience from its origination to its consummation.

Lotze's Philosophical Outlines.

Dictated Portions of the Latest Lectures (at Göttingen and Berlin) of Hermann Lotze. Translated and edited by GEORGE T. LADD, Professor of Philosophy in Yale College. 12mo. Cloth. About 180 pages in each volume. Mailing price per vol., \$1.00; Introd. price, 80 cents.

The German from which the translations are made consists of the dictated portions of his latest lectures (at Göttingen, and for a few months at Berlin) as formulated by Lotze himself, recorded in the notes of his hearers, and subjected to the most competent and thorough revision of Professor Rehnisch of Göttingen. The "Outlines" give, therefore, a mature and trustworthy statement, in language selected by this teacher of philosophy himself, of what may be considered as his final opinions upon a wide range of subjects. They have met with no little favor in Germany.

There is scarcely any other recent writer on philosophical subjects whose thoughts are so stimulating for their breadth, penetration, and candor; or with whom an acquaintance is so desirable for purposes of general culture through the philosophic way of considering life, with its interests in not merely pure thought, but also in morals, religion, and art.

It is also hoped that the use of these translations will further the work of teaching philosophy. Such condensed, orderly, and mature statements of conclusions on a wide range of philosophical questions will be found exceedingly valuable for both teacher and pupil. They furnish a *scheme* for all the instruction which the teacher is able to give in presenting and answering these questions. When skilfully used, they may be made to introduce the pupil to the widest fields of philosophy under the guidance of a great master, and in an interesting way. They present the applications of Metaphysic to art, religion, nature, and human conduct; — and they thus open regions of reflection into which the instruction of our colleges and universities scarcely takes their students at all, — regions, however, which are precisely the ones where such students both desire and need to go.

These translations have been undertaken with the kind permission of the German publisher, Herr S. Hirzel, of Leipsic.

Outlines of Metaphysic.

The Outlines of Metaphysic contains the scientific treatment of

those assumptions which enter into all our cognition of Reality. It consists of three parts, — Ontology, Cosmology, Phenomenology. The first part contains chapters on the Conception of Being, the Content of the Existent, Reality, Change, and Causation; the second treats of Space, Time, Motion, Matter, and the Coherency of Natural Events; the third, of the Subjectivity and Objectivity of Cognition. The Metaphysic of Lotze gives the key to his entire philosophical system. It should therefore be studied at the very entrance upon examination of that system.

Outlines of the Philosophy of Religion.

In the *Outlines of the Philosophy of Religion* Lotze seeks "to ascertain how much of the Content of Religion may be discovered, proved, or at least confirmed, agreeably to reason." In successive chapters he discusses the Proof for the Existence of God, the Attributes and Personality of the Absolute, the Conceptions of the Creation, the Preservation, and the Government, of the World, and of the World-time. The book closes with brief discussions of Religion and Morality, and Dogmas and Confessions.

Outlines of Practical Philosophy.

This one of the "Outlines" contains a discussion of Ethical Principles, Moral Ideals, and the Freedom of the Will, and then an application of the theory to the Individual, to Marriage, to Society, and to the State. Many interesting remarks on Divorce, Socialism, Representative Government, etc., abound throughout the volume. Its style is more popular than that of the other works of Lotze, and it will doubtless be widely read.

Outlines of Psychology.

The *Outlines of Psychology* treats of Simple Sensations, the Course of Representative Ideas, of Attention and Inference, of Intuitions of Objects as in Space, of the Apprehension of the External World by the Senses, of Errors of the Senses, of Feelings, and of Bodily Motions. Its second part is "theoretical," and discusses the nature, position, and changeable states of the Soul, its relations to time, and the reciprocal action of Soul and Body. It closes with a chapter on the "Kingdom of Souls." Lotze is peculiarly rich and suggestive in the discussion of Psychology.

Outlines of Æsthetics.

The *Outlines of Æsthetics* treats of the theory of the Beautiful and of Phantasy, and of the Realization and different Species of the Beautiful. Then follow brief chapters on Music, Architecture, Plastic Art, Painting, and Poetry. An appendix to this volume contains a brief biography of Lotze. This volume will be of the same size as those issued already. [Ready in 1886.]

Outlines of Logic.

The *Outlines of Logic* discusses both pure and applied Logic. Under the first head come the formation of Concepts, the theory of Judgment, a system of the forms of Judgment, the doctrine of argument or the drawing of conclusions, the figures of Aristotle, etc. The applied Logic presents the application of the forms of Conception, the adducing of Proof, and the Process of Thought in Discovery. The Logic is followed by a brief treatise on the Encyclopædia of Philosophy, in which are set forth the definition and method of Theoretical Philosophy, of Practical Philosophy, and of the Philosophy of Religion. This volume will be about one-fifth larger than the others, and will make an admirable brief text-book in Logic. [Ready in 1886.]

W. T. Harris, *Concord, Mass.*: The project of Prof. Ladd strikes me as by all means a practical one. I think this likely to be the most successful venture in philosophical publication that I have heard of lately.

John Bascom, *Pres. of Univ. of Wis.*: The publication of this book, and of the promised series, is very desirable.

Wm. F. Warren, *Pres. Boston University, in the "Western Christian Advocate"*: Prof. Ladd is rendering the English-reading public a great service by bringing out in neat and correct form translations of the dictated portions of the late Professor Hermann Lotze's lectures.

Noah K. Davis, *Prof. of Moral Phil., Univ. of Vir.*: I have desired

very much for the use of my pupils, who do not read German, a good translation of Lotze's "Dictate" ever since they began to appear. The present translation leaves nothing to be desired, except the completion of the series.

D. S. Gregory, *Pres. Lake Forest (Ill.) Univ.*: Lotze's *Outlines of Psychology* will give the young men a comprehensive grasp of all the capital questions at the basis of the current psychological discussions, and help them to estimate for themselves the real scientific standing of the prevalent sensational psychology. The work of the translator is admirably done, in consequence of his being able to enter into the thought of the author.

W. D. Wilson, *Cornell Univ., N.Y.*: I have for a long time regarded Lotze

as the soundest, as well as the profoundest, of all the German metaphysicians.

H. N. Gardner, Prof. of Philosophy, Smith College: I have decided to use the Philosophy of Religion next term in the College.

John Watson, Prof. Philosophy, Univ. of Kingston, Can.: I think that judiciously used, it would form a very good transition from the study of Kant to the study of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, especially the last.

The Critic, New York: The influence of Lotze would be most salutary in this country at the present time, and many would find in him the philosophic guide they need. His reconciliation between science and philosophy, or between materialism and idealism, is of great importance. To many it will commend itself as the only way out of the philosophic confusion of the present time. The student will find much crowded into a few pages, but Lotze has the merit of clearness.

New Englander: The translation of the volume before us is marked by that carefulness, accuracy, and thoroughness that characterize all of Prof. Ladd's work. The task he has accomplished was by no means a slight one, as those familiar with the German of Lotze will recognize; and if the English reader still finds difficulties in the way of a clear apprehension of the teaching of Lotze, we must remind him that these difficulties cannot be removed by a translation, however excellent it may be.

Literary World, Boston: Professor Ladd has done a great service to all those persons who are interested in the vital questions of the present day, but who are not sufficiently familiar with

German to make it easy to read, in the original tongue, one of the freshest and most profound of modern thinkers. We have not found ourselves able to agree with Lotze in all his doctrines; but have so greatly admired both the candor and the acute profundity of his thought, that we disagree with him modestly, with the concession that he is possibly right when we think him wrong. In the great main trend of his thought we hold him to be certainly right.

Mind, London, Eng.: No words are needed to commend such an enterprise, now that Lotze's importance as a thinker is so well understood. The translation is careful and painstaking.

Unitarian Review, Boston: We have already called attention to the admirable service Prof. Ladd is rendering students of philosophy by editing these dictated portions of the lectures of Hermann Lotze. This volume of Outlines is of great interest and suggestiveness. It is clear in vision and strong.

Congregationalist, Boston, Mass.: While we have not accepted the author's reasoning as a whole, we have found it remarkably suggestive and stimulating.

University, Chicago: It is this union in Lotze of scientific spirit, on the one hand, and of deep regard for the fundamental interests of man, on the other, that makes Lotze so significant a figure in philosophy at present, and the study of him so hopeful a sign.

We know of no book of 150 pages that contains more condensed food for thought, or more pregnant statement of informing truth on the higher themes of man's life than these Outlines of the Philosophy of Religion.

Higher English.

Minto's Manual of English Prose Literature.

Biographical and Critical. Designed mainly to show characteristics of style. By WILLIAM MINTO, M.A., Professor of Logic and English Literature in the University of Aberdeen, Scotland. 12mo. Cloth. 566 pages. Mailing price, \$2.15; Introduction, \$2.00.

London Standard: A masterly manual.

London Observer: It is not rash to say that this work is the first scientific treatment of the subject by an English writer. . . . Probably this book is one of the first attempts to apply to literature *pondus, numerus, et mensura*. About the ability as well as the originality of the work there cannot be two opinions. The views pronounced are expressed in terse, weighty, incisive *dicta*—sentences to be carried away as a geologist carries away a sample. . . . There can be little danger in saying that it is the best English book on the subject.

London School Board Chronicle: Here we do not find the *crambe repitita* of old critical formulæ, the

simple echoes of superannuated rhetorical dicta, but a close and careful analysis of the main attributes of style, as developed in the work of its greatest masters, stated with remarkable clearness of expression, and arranged upon a plan of most exact method. The elements and qualities of style are handled with striking subtlety of touch and discriminating tact. It is almost an exhaustive solution of the whole question.

London Educational Times: It is not often, among the innumerable manuals on the same subject, that it is our good fortune to come across so excellent a book as that before us. Carefully and thoughtfully written, it indeed offers a very marked contrast to the shallow and hastily-compiled productions that crowd our book market.

Minto's Characteristics of the English Poets,

from Chaucer to Shirley. By WILLIAM MINTO, M.A., Professor of Logic and English Literature in the University of Aberdeen, Scotland. 12mo. Cloth. xi + 483 pages. Mailing price, \$2.15; for Introduction, \$2.00.

The chief objects of the author are: (1) To bring into clear light the characteristics of the several poets; and, (2) to trace how far each was influenced by his literary predecessors and his contemporaries.

Arnold's English Literature.

Historical and Critical: With an Appendix on English Metres, and Summaries of the Different Literary Periods. By THOMAS ARNOLD, M.A., of University College, Oxford. American edition. Revised. 12mo. Cloth. 558 pages. Mailing price, \$1.65; Introduction (with or without the following pamphlet), \$1.50; Allowance for old book, 40 cts.

The Anglo-Saxon and Norman Periods have been republished, from the fourth revised English edition, and can be furnished in paper binding. Mailing price, 30 cts.; Introduction, 25 cts.

A distinguished English educator says: "In the Historical portion of the book I know not which to admire most, the happy art with which the dry facts of dates and names are woven into lucid, readable paragraphs, full of instruction, or the easy intelligence with which the leading characteristics of the more important writers are brought before the reader. In the Critical section the author is still more at home. The various styles of prose and verse are fully described; and this section, as well as the Historical, is illustrated by hundreds of well-chosen quotations. In the Appendix is a very useful account of English Metres, a subject I do not remember seeing treated with the same fulness in any other book of the kind."

The student of this manual will receive just impressions of the relative value of names and books, as well as political and religious influences. Indeed, the adjustment and arrangement of material is managed with wonderful dexterity and analytic clearness.

E. H. Griffin, *Prof. of Eng. Lit., Williams Coll.*: I introduced it here several years ago, thinking, after a careful examination of the various text-books, that it was, on the whole, the best. This is still my opinion.

J. Isham Bliss, *Prof. of Ret., Univ. of Vermont*: I know of no Manual of English Literature so useful as a text-book for College classes.

E. L. Hurd, *Pres. of Blackburn Univ.*: After testing it in this University for two years, I know no other book which so nearly meets the want.

John M. Ellis, *Prof. of Eng. Lit., Oberlin Coll., Ohio*: An excellent treatise,

and well adapted for the use of classes in high schools and colleges. I believe the book is doing, and will do, much to promote this important study.

D. S. Stephens, *Prof. of Eng. Lit., Adrian Coll., Mich.*: It is still in use here, and gives good satisfaction. (March 7, 1882.)

H. H. Morgan, *Prin. of High Sch., St. Louis*: I should most fully recommend it to any one whose interest in literature was that of the student; for he would find much which could otherwise be obtained only by extensive reading.

Hudson's Expurgated Shakespeare, for Schools.

Clubs, and Families. Revised and enlarged Editions of twenty-three Plays. Carefully expurgated, with Explanatory Notes at the bottom of the page, and Critical Notes at the end of each volume. By H. N. HUDSON, LL.D., late Professor of English Literature in Boston University; editor of *The Harvard Shakespeare*, and, for more than thirty years, a Teacher of Shakespeare in the Schools. One play in each volume. Square 16mo. Varying in size from 128-253 pages. Mailing price of each: Cloth, 50 cts.; Paper, 35 cts. Introduction price: Cloth, 45 cts.; Paper, 30 cts. **Per set (in box), \$12.00. (To teachers, \$10.00.)**

That Dr. Hudson has unusual qualifications for annotating a School Shakespeare will appear from the opinions of Shakespeareans, Professors, and Editors, from which we quote:—

"He is a first-rate teacher."

"His style is fresh, original, and pungent."

"His notes are free from pedantry and dullness."

"He has nobility of purpose and purity of heart."

"He keeps his readers on the qui vive from first to last."

"He eliminates gross language without marring the plot."

"He gives results without annoying students with processes."

"He never forgets that he is the Editor and not the Author."

"His insight is fully equal to the best English or German critics."

"He justifies the saying that it requires genius to appreciate and interpret genius."

"He has so caught the very spirit of his master that he intuitively makes the best choice of disputed texts and throws clearest light on obscure passages."

☞ See Editor's **Essays on Education** (described on page 47) for a full account of his methods of teaching Shakespeare and other English Classics."

Each Play is introduced by a discussion of its history, the source of the plot, the political situation, a critical estimate of the characters and general characteristics, with much other matter invaluable to the student. These introductory essays are transcripts from the Editor's "*Life, Art, and Characters of Shakespeare*," and contain much valuable matter not found in any other school edition.

The notes are the same as in "*The Harvard Edition*"; also the text, except that it is SCRUPULOUSLY and CLEANLY expurgated.

The expurgations consist in the bare omission of such lines and expressions as the Editor has always deemed it necessary to omit in class. The expurgations do not in any case reach so far as to impair in the least either the delineation of character or the dramatic action. On the other hand, no matter is retained not fairly pronounceable in any class, however composed.

In speaking of Mr. Hudson's fitness for expurgating Shakespeare, and of the result of his work in this direction, the keen critic, Mr. Edwin P. Whipple, says: "*We believe that only he who is competent to comprehend the wonderful genius of the world's greatest mind, is a fit person to remove from Shakespeare's plays those passages and scenes which offend modern notions of propriety. Mr. Hudson has done this delicate task with incomparable tact and felicity. The beauty, grandeur, sublimity, wit, humor, and pathos of Shakespeare are preserved, and nothing is omitted that is really essential to the comprehension of Shakespeare's genius as the greatest poet and dramatist of the world.*"

The Editor uses the plan of foot-notes instead of massing the annotation all together at the end of the play, because ample experience has assured him, beyond all peradventure, that whatever of explanation young students need of Shakespeare's text—and they certainly need a good deal—is much better every way when placed directly under the eye, so that they can hardly miss it; and because at least nineteen in twenty of such pupils will pass over an obscure word or phrase without understanding it, rather than stay to look up the explanation in another part of the volume.

Recent editors of Greek and Latin Classics are putting their annotations on the same page with the text. The strong reasons given for thus placing their notes are much stronger reasons when applied to similar annotations of any classic in the vernacular.

In the amount of annotation, the Editor has been mainly guided by the results of his own experience in teaching; aiming to give so many and such notes as he has found needful or conducive to a full and clear understanding of the Poet's thought. He has wished to avoid distracting or diverting the student's attention overmuch from the special subject-matter of the Poet's scenes.

The series consists of the twenty-three plays enumerated below, two of which have never before been included in our school series.

We furnish of the Old Edition, in paper covers, the plays starred in the following list (Mailing Price, 25 cts.; Introduction, 20 cts.): —

- | | |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------|
| *A Midsummer-Night's Dream. | *Henry the Fifth. |
| *The Merchant of Venice. | *Henry the Eighth. |
| *Much Ado About Nothing. | *Romeo and Juliet. |
| *As You Like It. | *Julius Cæsar. |
| Twelfth Night. | *Hamlet. |
| *The Tempest. | *King Lear. |
| The Winter's Tale. | *Macbeth. |
| King John. | Antony and Cleopatra. |
| Richard Second. | *Othello. |
| Richard Third. | Cymbeline. |
| *Henry Fourth, Part First. | *Coriolanus. |
| Henry Fourth, Part Second. | |

H. H. Furness, in his *Variorum edition of King Lear*, page 438: I cannot refrain from here recording my thorough admiration for Mr. Hudson's æsthetic criticisms. No Shakespeare student can afford to overlook them.

Joseph Crosby, *the Shakespearian*, Zanesville, Ohio: They give results, without annoying or vexing students with *processes*. They are the *best* editions for classes and clubs that I know of; and I have read all. The explanatory notes are, where of course they ought always to be, at the foot of the page; they give what the editor understands to be the correct explanations at once; and do not puzzle readers with a lot of variorum explanations, and leave them, unaided, to select for themselves which are the true ones. And I like his *style* too. It is fresh, original, and pungent. He is determined that none of his readers shall go to sleep over his notes and monographs.

F. J. Child, *Prof. of Eng. Lit.*, *Harvard Coll.*: Any such books from Mr. Hudson's hand must command attention.

Cyrus Northrop, *Prof. of Eng. Lit.*, *Yale Coll.*: They are convenient in form and edited by Hudson, — two good things which I can see at a glance.

Oliver Wendell Holmes: An edition of any play of Shakespeare's to which Mr. Hudson's name is affixed does not need a line from anybody to commend it.

E. P. Whipple: That Hudson has made a school-book out of some of the greatest of Shakespeare's plays, should be received with the same glad recognition with which all teachers would welcome the announcement that Agassiz had condensed in a school-book the results of his studies in natural history. None but a master in

the matter he treats can prepare a really good and inspiring educational book for the young. The notes are models of brevity and intelligence. Indeed, for the education of the youthful mind, as far as regards its initiation into the knowledge of the great genius of the English and the human race, nothing could be better.

N.Y. Tribune: Not even the great masters in Shakespearian criticism have evinced a more subtle comprehension of the finer sense of the many-sided bard, or have given a more vigorous and pregnant utterance to their conceptions of his meaning. His commentary is a study of profound and delicate thought. The foot-notes are admirable and especially judicious, where ambiguity occurs by design, in luring the mind to the better meaning.

London Tablet: It would be difficult to speak too highly of the Introductions and Notes, and of the judgment with which the gross language has been eliminated without marring the plot of the piece or the poetry. The whole forms the best family Shakespeare by far that we have ever seen.

E. H. Griffin, Prof. of Eng. Lit., Williams Coll.: Mr. Hudson's textbooks need no commendation.

W. R. Shipman, Prof. of Eng. Lit., Tufts Coll.: I make more use of it than of any other edition.

Louise M. Hodgkins: Prof. of Eng. Lit., Wellesley Coll., Mass.: To both pupil and teacher the notes and suggestions never fail to be pleasing, interesting, instructive, and profitable. Through no source do I gain more helpful suggestions in my Shakespeare studies than by the clear notes and excellent criticisms of Mr. Hudson.

Geo. C. Chase, Prof. of Eng. Lit., Bates Coll., Me.: The preface, introduction, and notes are admirable. I am much pleased with the amount and kind of help that his notes are designed to give.

H. L. Chapman, Prof. of Eng. Lit., Bowdoin Coll., Me.: The editing of these books is, of course, admirable.

D. S. Gregory, Pres. Lake Forest Univ., Ill.: I have been using them and have found them exceedingly valuable in class work. In my estimation Hudson stands alone in this country in Shakespearian criticism.

J. O. Halliwell-Phillips, Brighthelm, England: The Antony and Cleopatra, and Othello just to hand, are the neatest, ablest, and nicest books of the kind ever seen. (Sept. 8, 1881.)

T. J. Todd, Prof. of Eng. Lit., Vanderbilt Univ., Tenn.: I consider Hudson's school plays, in all regards, the best I have seen. I use them in my class, and generally in my own readings.

H. M. Whitney, Prof. of Eng. Lit., Beloit Coll., Wis.: I have long esteemed Prof. Hudson very highly as a Shakespearian scholar, and use his "School Shakespeare" with my classes.

David E. Beach, Prof. of Rhetoric, etc., Marietta Coll., Ohio: They give criticisms which are at once profound and original, yet adapted to the capacities of ordinary students, and abstaining from matters of merely antiquarian research.

J. B. Unthank, Pres. Wilmington Coll., Ohio: I think them better adapted to the use of students than any other edition with which I am acquainted.


The Harvard Edition of Shakespeare's Complete

Works. By HENRY N. HUDSON, LL.D., Author of the *Life, Art, and Characters of Shakespeare*, Editor of *School Shakespeare*, etc. In *Twenty Volumes*; duodecimo; two plays in each volume; also in *Ten Volumes* of four plays each.

RETAIL PRICES.

20-vol. edition, cloth	\$25.00	10-vol. edition, cloth	\$20.00
half-calf	55.00	half-calf	40.00

HUDSON'S "LIFE, ART, AND CHARACTERS OF SHAKESPEARE" (2 vols.) are uniform in size and binding with THE HARVARD EDITION, and are included with it at the following retail prices. Cloth, \$4.00 per set; Half-calf, \$8.00 per set.

 *Buyers should be careful in ordering not to confound the Harvard Shakespeare with an Old Edition made in 1851, and sold under another name.*

The Harvard Edition has been undertaken and the plan of it shaped with a special view to making the Poet's pages pleasant and attractive to general readers.

Within the last thirty years great advances and additions have been made in the way of preparation for such a work, and these volumes bring the whole matter of Shakespeare up abreast with the latest researches.

"The Edition includes 'The Two Noble Kinsmen,' which will be new to most readers of Shakespeare. It was first published in 1634, and has not generally been included in editions of his works. That it was his work, jointly with Fletcher, as was also 'Henry VIII.,' it was reserved for our own time to establish, and mainly by internal evidence, and it is difficult to read the first scene of the first act without saying, with Sidney Walker, '*Aut Shakespeareus aut diabolus*,' and we are glad that Mr. Hudson gave it place and has marked the lines of Fletcher by asterisks." — *The Churchman*, N.Y.

The first volume contains "the Burbage portrait," and a life of the Poet. A history of each play is given in its appropriate volume.

The plays are arranged in three distinct series: Comedies, Histories, and Tragedies; and the plays of each series presented, as nearly as may be, in the chronological order of the writing.

An obvious merit of this edition is, that each volume has two sets of notes; one mainly devoted to explaining the text, and placed at the foot of the page; the other mostly occupied with matters of textual comment and criticism, and printed at the end of each play. The edition is thus admirably suited to the uses both of the general reader and of the special student. General readers prefer to have explanations directly before them; and in at least nine cases out of ten they will pass over an obscure word or phrase or allusion without understanding it, rather than look up the explanation in another volume or another part of the same volume. Often, too, in case the explanation be not directly at hand, they will go elsewhere in quest of it, and then find, after all, that the editor has left the matter unexplained; whereas, with foot-notes they will see at once how the matter stands, and will be spared the labour and vexation of a fruitless search.

The foot-notes supply such and so much of explanatory comment as may be required by people who read Shakespeare, not to learn philology or the technicalities of the scholiast, but to learn Shakespeare himself; to take in his thought, to taste his wisdom, and to feel his beauty.

A Special Circular giving fuller information will be sent free on application.

How this edition is regarded by Our Most Eminent Shakespeareans, may be judged from the following, which we are permitted to publish. These reviews seem to afford evidence that this is to be "The Standard American Edition of Shakespeare?"

J. O. Halliwell-Phillips, *the Shakespearean, Hollingbury Copse, Brighton, England*: Your kind transmission of Mr. Hudson's edition of Shakespeare has given me the greatest treat that I have had for many a day, and I can hardly express how much pleasure it affords me to possess so admirable a work. The prefaces are written with such exceptional ability and knowledge, while the division of the excellent notes into two sets is a splendid arrangement that alone would give a character to the work. There are of course numerous critical points on which other writers (including myself) may differ from Mr. Hudson, as well as editions more adapted for specialists, but I cannot imagine one more suitable for the public at large, and I, trust that you will allow me to congratulate you heartily on its production. (*Feb. 7, 1882.*)

Hudson's Life, Art, and Characters of Shake-

speare (Revised Edition, 1882). By HENRY N HUDSON, LL.D., Editor of "*The Harvard Shakespeare*," "*Expurgated School Shakespeare*," etc. In 2 vols. 12mo. 969 pages. The chapters on *King Henry VIII*, *Hamlet*, *Julius Cæsar*, and *Macbeth* have also been re-written, and a full index of subjects added. Uniform in size with "*THE HARVARD SHAKESPEARE*," and matches it in the following bindings:—

Cloth	Retail Price, \$4.00 per set.
Half-calf	" " 8.00 "

These two volumes contain:—

1. *The Life of Shakespeare.*
2. *An Historical Sketch of the Origin and Growth of the Drama in England*, discussing under this head Miracle-Plays, Moral-Plays, and Comedy and Tragedy.
3. *Shakespeare's Contemporaries.*
4. *Shakespeare's Art*, discussing under this head, Nature and Use of Art, Principles of Art, Dramatic Composition, Characterization, Humour, Style, Moral Spirit.
5. *Shakespeare's Characters*, containing critical discourses on twenty-five of the Plays.

E. P. Whipple, *Boston*: In the analysis of Shakespeare's characters Mr. Hudson puts forth all his force and subtlety of thought. He almost forgets that they are not actual beings, however much they may be "real" beings. Shakespeare's characters have so taken real existence in his mind, that he unconsciously speaks of them as one speaks of persons he daily meets. This is the charm of his criticisms. His great object is to *educate* people into a solid knowledge of Shakespeare as well as to quicken their love for him; and, in this educational purpose, he aims to delight the readers he instructs.

H. H. Furness, *the Shakespearean*: I cannot refrain from recording my thorough admiration for Mr. Hudson's

æsthetic criticisms. No Shakespeare student can afford to overlook them.

London Athenæum: They deserve to find a place in every library devoted to Shakespeare, to editions of his works, to his biography, or to the works of commentators.

Hon. G. S. Hillard: When any one differs from Mr. Hudson's conclusions, it behooves him to examine well the grounds of his dissent. We cannot read anywhere a dozen pages of these volumes without admitting that we are conversing with a thinker, and not merely a scholar. His views, be they deemed right or wrong, sound or unsound, are unborrowed. They are coined in his own mint, and bear his image and superscription.

A Handbook of Poetics.

For Students of English Verse. By FRANCIS B. GUMMERE, PH.D. Head Master of the Swain Free School, New Bedford, Mass., and formerly Instructor in English in Harvard College. 12mo. Cloth. vi + 250 pages. Mailing price, \$1.10; for Introduction, \$1.00.

The increased attention paid in schools and colleges to the critical study of our own literature demands that poetry, in which a great part of this literature is written, should be taught as a science. Knowledge of the science of poetry should precede or accompany the study of poems. A text-book on the subject ought to simplify, not complicate, the work of both teacher and scholar; and that it does have this effect is proved by the wide use of manuals of *Poetik* in German schools.

The book has three divisions,—Subject-Matter, Style, Metre. Each is treated from two points of view,—the historical, tracing the growth of different kinds of subject, of expression, or of rhythm; and the theoretical, stating clearly the principles and laws of the matter discussed. Controversy is avoided; the main object of the book is to state facts generally admitted by the best scholars, forming a foundation on which the intelligent teacher may base his own work and his own views.

Prof. J. Schipper, of the University of Vienna: Zusammenfassende Bücher dieser Art sind, wenn sie mit der Umsicht und Einsicht, wie das Ihrige, ausgearbeitet werden, die besten Förderer nützlicher Kenntnisse. Ich wünsche daher von Herzen Ihrem Buche die weiteste Verbreitung, und zweifle nicht dass sie demselben zu Theil werden wird.

F. J. Child, Prof. of Eng., Harvard College: I think you have an exceedingly fine book in Mr. Gummere's Poetics.

James W. Bright, Dept. of English, Johns Hopkins University: The comprehensive view of the development of poetic forms here laid down is

in accord with the highest scholarship, and will therefore be a new message to many quarters. The book, moreover, is admirably adapted to the inculcation of a true historic sense of the long and remarkable career of English verse, from Widsid to Whittier.

F. A. March, Prof. of Eng. Lit., Lafayette College: An excellent book; a work of good sense and good taste, and much learning in small compass.

J. M. Garnett, Prof. of Eng. Lit., Univ. of Virginia: It has fulfilled my anticipations, and it supplies a real deficiency in text-books. I do not know, anywhere in English, of a better treatment of the subject.

History.

Outlines of Mediæval and Modern History.

By P. V. N. MYERS, A.M., President of Belmont Coll., O.; Author of "Outlines of Ancient History," and "Remains of Lost Empires." 12mo. Half Morocco. xii + 740 pages. With colored maps, reproduced, by permission, from Freeman's Historical Atlas. Mailing price, \$1.65; for Introduction, \$1.50.

This work aims to blend in a single narrative accounts of the **social, political, literary, intellectual, and religious developments of the peoples of mediæval and modern times**, — to give in simple outline the story of civilization since the meeting, in the 5th century of our era, of Latin and Teuton upon the soil of the Roman Empire in the West. The author's conception of History, based on the definitions of Ueberweg, that it is the unfolding of the essence of spirit, affords the key-note to the work. Its aim is to deal with the essential elements, not the accidental features, of the life of the race.

This guiding idea has determined the character of the analysis of the subject-matter. The principles of grouping are the laws of historic development. The divisions and subdivisions of the subject being thus philosophical and natural, with cause and effect as the associating principle, the whole has unity and cohesion, and readily impressing itself upon the memory of the reader, forms a permanent outline for his guidance in all further historical work.

The analysis completed, the author's aim has been the expansion of this into a clear, continuous, and attractive narrative, — into a story that should at every point hold the attention and throughout sustain the interest of the reader, without sacrifice of the condensed and *suggestive* style suited to the needs of the student and the teacher.

W. F. Allen, *Professor of History*, excellence, and to give a remarkably *University of Wisconsin*: Mr. Myers' clear and vivid picture of mediæval book seems to me to be a work of high history.

Geo. W. Knight, *Prof. of History and English Literature, Ohio State Univ., Columbus*. The author seems to have gotten hold of the active principle, the leading motives and tendencies of each age; to have taken a comprehensive view of the development of man's ideas, of nations, and of governments. Then he has grouped the various events in such a way as will bring clearly to view these different phases of the world-development without ignoring what may be called the collateral events.

E. R. Ruggles, *Prof. Mod. Lang., Chandler Scientific Dept., Dartmouth Coll.*: The work impresses me very favorably, and I think we shall introduce it. (March 8, 1886.)

Arthur Latham Perry, *Prof. of Hist. and Political Economy, Williams*

Coll.: I find proofs of unusual diligence and studious investigation, and a happy skill in narration. (Feb. 27, '86.)

Alexander Johnston, *Prof. of Jurisprudence, and Political Economy, Princeton College*: I can only say, for the period covered by the specimen pages received, that I like the spirit of the author and his success in putting it into shape, and shall be very well satisfied to make the work the starting point of my son's reading on this subject, when he arrives at that stage of development. (Sept. 29, 1885.)

A. Rittenhous, *Prof. of History, Dickinson Coll., Pa.*: I am much pleased with the work. If present plans are carried out with reference to the history course, it will be introduced next fall term. This is my best endorsement. (March 3, 1886.)

The Reader's Guide to English History.

A classified list of works in English History, including poems, dramas, and works of fiction, arranged by periods, for convenience of reference. With a Supplement, extending the plan over other departments of history, — ancient, modern, European, and American. By WILLIAM FRANCIS ALLEN, A.M., Professor in the University of Wisconsin. Long 8vo. Paper. 50 pages. Mailing price, 30 cts.; Introduction, 25 cts. The Supplement can be had separately; Mailing price, 10 cts.

The arrangement is that of four parallel columns upon two opposite pages: the first column containing the English sovereigns, in the several houses, in the form of genealogical tables; the second, good historical reading, whether histories, biographies, or essays; the third, novels, poems, and dramas illustrating that period of English history, — also, so far as possible, arranged chronologically; the fourth, the same class of works, illustrating contemporary history.

F. A. March, *Prof. of the English Language and Comp. Philology, Lafayette Coll.*: It is a good idea, and will be a useful book. We are all novel-readers.

H. B. Adams, *Associate Prof. of*

History, Johns Hopkins Univ.: I know something of Professor Allen's historical scholarship, and it is sufficient praise of this little book for handy reference to say that it sustains the author's reputation for accuracy, sound judgment, and nice discrimination. (Nov. 6, '82.)

The Leading Facts of English History

By D. H. MONTGOMERY. 12mo. Cloth. xxxiv + 254 pages, with a colored map. Mailing price, \$1.10; for Introduction, \$1.00.

This work aims to present very briefly, yet clearly and accurately, the broad vital facts of English History in their connection with the great laws of national growth.

It opens with an account of prehistoric Britain, and of the Roman attempt to force the framework of a high civilization on an unwilling people. The work then proceeds through the English and Norman invasions with their results, the struggle between the barons and the crown, the rise of Parliament, the gradual destruction of feudalism, and the final establishment, through revolution, of the right of the people to self-government. Free use is made of the researches of specialists, of ancient records, and of archæological collections, while the color, life, and movement essential to the best history have been studiously preserved.

The full Tables of chronology, statistics, and authorities will be found, it is believed, of special value.

P. V. N. Myers, *President Belmont College, O.*: The author knows how to seize upon the salient points of his subject and how to throw the best light upon the features he selects to exhibit. The work is concise, clear, and accurate. It forms an admirable framework about which to construct the complete edifice of English history. (Feb. 20, 1886.)

W. P. Atkinson, *Prof. Eng. and Hist., Mass. Inst. Tech., Boston*: I have read it with much pleasure. It is that uncommon kind of book, a readable short sketch. It is fresh and vigorous, and the references seem to me very well selected. I cordially recommend it to all students and teachers of English history. (Jan. 2, 1886.)

The "leading facts" are judiciously chosen, and related in a vivacious and entertaining manner. The tabular material is very convenient for reference. (Feb. 2, 1886.)

Geo. W. Knight, *Prof. of Hist. and Eng. Lit., Ohio State University, Columbus*: I have examined it with considerable care, and find much in it that pleases me. The conception is good, and the execution generally so. It seems freer from actual errors of statement than most books of the textbook order. (Feb. 20, 1886.)

Alfred S. Roe, *Prin. High School, Worcester, Mass.*: I have looked it

through very
tain, then
acc
(Fe

111.85/LOT



1785

